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In 1982, Professor David Sonenshein was one of the first scholars to 
analyze the growing body of case law applying the residual exception to 
the hearsay rule.
1
  His Article—The Residual Exceptions to the Federal 
Hearsay Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule (hereinafter “Residual 
Exceptions”)—provided a step-by-step analysis of the elements of the 
residual exception.
2
  Residual Exceptions surveyed and critiqued the 
early prevailing interpretations of the rule and demonstrated a growing 
trend where courts were endorsing interpretations of the exception in a 
manner inconsistent with the original intent and purpose of the rule.  In 
Residual Exceptions, Professor Sonenshein argued, and some courts 
agreed,
3
 that the federal courts “have neither interpreted nor applied the 
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 1.  David A. Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Two 
Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867 (1982) [hereinafter Residual Exceptions].  
For later discussions of the residual exception(s), see Joseph W. Rand, The Residual Exceptions to 
the Federal Hearsay Rule: The Futile and Misguided Attempt to Restrain Judicial Discretion, 80 
GEO. L. J. 873 (1992); James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay Exception Reconsidered, 20 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 787 (1993); and Roger C. Park, Hearsay, Dead or Alive?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 647 (1998). 
 2.  As originally enacted, there were in fact two residual exceptions to the hearsay rule—one 
for available declarants and one for unavailable declarants.  See FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5) 
(repealed 1997), FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 18–19 (1975), reprinted in 4 JAMES F. BAILEY & 
OSCAR M. TRELLES, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED 
DOCUMENTS (1980).  Those rules have been combined, and now the residual exception can be found 
at Rule 807.  FED. R. EVID. 807.  There was no substantive change to the underlying law as a result 
of this amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence.  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) advisory committee’s 
note to 1997 amendments. 
 3.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pope, 491 N.E.2d 240, 244 & n.9 (Mass. 1986) (quoting 
Residual Exceptions to support the conclusion that “[w]e do not believe the administration of justice 
in this Commonwealth would be advanced by adoption of [the residual exception] whose application 
in practice has been marked by conflicting and illogical results”). 
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residual exceptions consistently with their purposes or terms.”
4
  The 
article concluded with a minor amendment to the residual exception that 
would make the text and judicial interpretations of the exceptions better 




This Article serves to update and expand upon the early but in-depth 
analysis of the residual exception to the hearsay rule.  Although the 
residual exception began as a matter of federal, rule-based law, state 
courts and legislatures have also considered, and in some cases rejected, 
the exception and appropriate scope.  Thirty states have adopted a 
residual exception in their state rules of evidence, including numerous 
states that have enacted modified or limited versions of the federal 
exception.
6
  This Article builds on Residual Exceptions by surveying 
both federal and state cases on the residual exception and comparing the 
predominant state-law approaches to the admission of residual hearsay 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Like the original article, this Article traces the variety of approaches 
courts have adopted when interpreting and analyzing the proper scope of 
the exception.  It begins with a brief overview of the residual exception, 
examining the origins of the exception and the ensuing judicial 
liberalization of its requirements.
7
  This Article then analyzes the 
“trustworthiness,” “probativeness,” and notice requirements of the 
exception,
8
 looking at both federal and state interpretations of the rule 
and offering a critique of a number of judicial interpretations of the Rule.  
Next, this Article provides an in-depth, fifty-state survey on the residual 
exception, highlighting the various approaches states use for the 
admission of residual hearsay.
9
  The Article concludes that among the 
state courts that have adopted the exception, many have been far more 
rigorous than their federal counterparts in setting out the markers that 
trial courts should use to determine the admissibility of residual 
hearsay.  The use of these markers brings more coherence to trial courts’ 
exercise of discretion in discriminating between admissible and 
inadmissible residual hearsay. 
                                                          
 4.  Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 867.  
 5.  Id. at 901–05 (proposing that the notice provision of the hearsay rule be amended to adopt 
the “flexible view,” which would better serve the underlying purpose of the notice requirement). 
 6.  See infra Appendix.  
 7.  See infra Part II. 
 8.  See infra Part III. 
 9.  See infra Part IV and Appendix. 
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II. THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTION THEN AND NOW 
A. Origins of the Residual Exception: Dallas County and Probative 
Force of Hearsay 
The residual exception grew out of the Fifth Circuit’s 1961 decision 
in Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.
10
  Writing for the 
court, Judge John Minor Wisdom began, “On a bright, sunny morning, 
July 7, 1957, the clock tower of the Dallas County Courthouse at Selma, 
Alabama, commenced to lean, made loud cracking and popping noises, 
then fell, and telescoped into the courtroom.”
11
  In the case, Dallas 
County requested for its insurer, Commercial Union Assurance 
Company, to cover the damage resulting from the collapse of the Dallas 
County Courthouse clock tower.
12
  At trial, the insurance company 
contested liability for the resulting damage and claimed that the building 
was structurally defective.
13
  In support of its claim, the company 
introduced a nearly sixty-year-old newspaper article about a 1901 fire in 
the clock tower that ignited when the tower was stricken by lightning.
14
  
Despite the County’s obvious claim that “[y]ou cannot cross-examine a 
newspaper,” and the court’s acknowledgment that the newspaper article 
did not satisfy any established exception to the hearsay rule, it was 
admitted into evidence at trial.
15
  The Fifth Circuit upheld the trial court’s 
admission of the article on the grounds that it was sufficiently 
trustworthy and necessary—that is, the court reasoned that the article 
was the only evidence available to prove the insurer’s claim and it came 
from an inherently reliable source.
16
 
In the same year that Dallas County was announced, renowned 
evidence professor (and soon-to-be judge) Jack Weinstein published the 
seminal article Probative Force of Hearsay, in which he espoused his 
views on how the rules of evidence should address the admission of 
hearsay evidence.
17
  Judge Weinstein began by examining the three 
                                                          
 10.  286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).  
 11.  Id. at 390. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 390–91 (discussing the newspaper article at length).  
 15.  Id. at 391–92, 397–98.  
 16.  Id. at 397–98. 
 17.  Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331 (1961).  Judge 
Weinstein begins the article with a concise description of the hearsay rules’ problems: “The present 
evidence rules fall short of providing a satisfactory solution to the hearsay problem.  They exclude 
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primary solutions that had been proposed to resolve the hearsay 
problem—rejecting all three in the process.
18
  Judge Weinstein rejected 
the two proposals on both ends of the spectrum: admitting hearsay freely 
and excluding hearsay absolutely.
19
  On the one hand, unrestricted 
admission of hearsay would undermine the importance of cross-
examination to the fact-finding process;
20
 on the other hand, an absolute 
prohibition on the admission of hearsay failed to account for the 
“practicalities of our trial practice.”
21
  Judge Weinstein then rejected the 
class-based hearsay exceptions proposed by John Henry Wigmore—the 
approach codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
22
  Such an approach, 
Judge Weinstein cautioned, “makes admissible a class of hearsay rather 
than particular hearsay for which, in the circumstances of the case, there 
is need and assurance of reliability.”
23
  To Judge Weinstein, it is those 
two considerations—the necessity of the hearsay to the proponent and 




Because all three of those approaches failed to premise admissibility 
of an out-of-court statement on the probative force of hearsay, Judge 
Weinstein proposed a fourth approach: “Admission [b]ased [u]pon 
[p]robative [f]orce [w]ith [p]rocedural [s]afeguards.”
25
  “[I]t would 
seem desirable,” he argued, “to abandon the class exception system and 
substitute individual treatment if such a practice were to be combined 
with advance notice to the opponent when hearsay was to be 
introduced.”
26
  Under Judge Weinstein’s probativeness approach to 
resolving the hearsay problem, admission would “depend upon probative 
force weighed against the possibility of prejudice, unnecessary use of 
                                                          
evidence that has a higher probative force than evidence they admit.  They fail to provide adequate 
procedural devices to minimize the possibility of misjudging the probative force of hearsay 
admitted.” Id. at 331. 
 18.  Id. at 334–42.  Of note, in 1961 the Uniform Rules of Evidence were in effect.  Under the 
Uniform Rules, “[a]ny . . . evidence tending to impair or support the credibility of the declarant is 
admissible if it would have been admissible had the declarant been a witness.” UNIF. R. EVID. 65 
(repealed 1975), UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 211 (1953), reprinted in 1 BAILEY & TRELLES, 
supra note 2. 
 19.  Id. at 334–37. 
 20.  Id. at 334–36. 
 21.  Id. at 337. 
 22.  Id. at 337–38. 
 23.  Id. at 337. 
 24.  See id. at 337–38. 
 25.  Id. at 338. 
 26.  Id.  
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court time, and availability of more satisfactory evidence.”
27
  In order 
“[t]o prevent burdening the trial with a great deal of evidence of small 
probative force,” Judge Weinstein rationalized, “it would be well to 
permit the court a greater freedom to exclude than it normally 
exercises.”
28
  The residual exception to the hearsay rule grew in large 




That same year, the Judicial Conference approved a proposal to draft 
federal rules of evidence.
30
  By 1965, the Advisory Committee on Rules 
of Evidence—comprised of scholars, practitioners, and judges (including 
Judge Weinstein who was appointed to the bench while serving on the 
Committee)—was established.
31
  The Committee debated at length the 
requirements for the admission of hearsay under the Federal Rules, and 
those debates demonstrate how Judge Weinstein’s proposal inspired what 
came to be known as the residual exception.
32
 
For instance, in March 1971, the Committee issued its Revised Draft 
of Proposed Rules of Evidence in which it addressed “the hearsay 
problem.”
33
  The Committee explained that it was considering three 
approaches to hearsay, “[s]ince no one advocates excluding all 
hearsay.”
34
  The three approaches include (1) abolition of the hearsay 
                                                          
 27. Id. at 338–39.  Judge Weinstein’s proposal also contained several procedural requirements, 
including a pretrial notice requirement, allowance for judges to comment openly on the weight of the 
evidence, and various precautionary measures related to appellate review.  Id. at 338–48. 
 28.  Id. at 338; see id. at 353 (“Exercise of discretion rather than mechanical rules requires more 
thought and consideration of such factors as surprise, possible prejudice through overestimation of 
force, and the availability of other evidence more easily assessed.”). 
 29.  In 1968, Judge Weinstein gave a speech before the Annual Advocacy Institute in which he 
proposed seven alternative approaches to the admission of hearsay evidence under the forthcoming 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  As he did in his 1961 article, Judge Weinstein concluded:  
[A] recodification and liberalization of the rules of hearsay with an explicit general 
statement of principle for admitting useful hearsay which does not fall within a specific 
exception seems preferable.  The court should, in addition, be given greater freedom in 
civil than in criminal cases and in bench than in jury trials to admit hearsay. 
Jack B. Weinstein, Alternatives to the Present Hearsay Rules, 44 F.R.D. 375, 388 (1968). 
 30.  Jon R. Waltz, The New Federal Rules of Evidence: An Overview, 52 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 
346, 347 (1975).  For a history of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see id. at 346–50.  For an early 
discussion on reading and interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Edward W. Cleary, 
Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908 (1978). 
 31.  Waltz, supra note 30, at 347 & n.9. 
 32.  See id. at 347–48 (discussing committee process and debate). 
 33.  Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Judicial Conference of the U.S., Revised Draft of 
Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 408–13 
(1971). 
 34.  Id. at 409. 
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rule in favor of free admission of all hearsay; (2) Judge Weinstein’s 
proposal to “admit hearsay possessing sufficient probative force, but with 
procedural safeguards”; and (3) revision of the class-based, common-
law-hearsay exceptions.
35
  After rejecting the proposal to freely admit all 
hearsay so as to preserve “the traditional requirement of some particular 
assurance of credibility as a condition precedent to admitting the hearsay 
declaration,” the Committee turned to Judge Weinstein’s proposal.
36
  
Expressly citing Probative Force of Hearsay, the Committee began by 
acknowledging that “[a]bandonment of the system of class exceptions in 
favor of individual treatment in the setting of the particular case . . . has 
been impressively advocated.”
37
  Despite the persuasiveness of Judge 
Weinstein’s proposal, the Committee opted to retain the categorical 
exceptions, subject to subsequent revisions.
38
 
In rejecting the all-out-discretionary approach championed by Judge 
Weinstein in Probative Force of Hearsay, the Advisory Committee 
contended that such a proposal “involv[es] too great a measure of 
judicial discretion, minimiz[es] the predictability of rulings, enhanc[es] 
the difficulties of preparation for trial, add[s] a further element to the 
already over-complicated congeries of pretrial procedures, and requir[es] 
substantially different rules for civil and criminal cases.”
39
  As a 
testament to the persuasiveness of Judge Weinstein’s original proposal, 
however, the Committee’s Revised Draft included a compromise: the 
residual exception.
40
  While the residual exceptions in 803(24) and 
804(b)(6) (now Rule 807) “do not contemplate an unfettered exercise of 
judicial discretion,” as the Committee observed, “they do provide for 
treating new and presently unanticipated situations which demonstrate a 
trustworthiness within the spirit of the specifically stated exceptions.”
41
 
After the Committee submitted the Revised Draft to the Supreme 
Court, “[t]he focus for development of a discretionary power to admit 
hearsay shifted from the courts to Congress.”
42
  Political tension between 
the Court and Congress ensued after the Chief Justice submitted the 
                                                          
 35.  Id. at 409–10. 
 36.  Id. at 410. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 410–11. 
 39.  Id. at 410. 
 40.  See id. at 411 (discussing the residual exceptions and stating they were “calculated to 
encourage growth and development in this area of the law, while conserving the values and 
experience of the past as a guide to the future”). 
 41.  Id. at 437. 
 42.  Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 871. 
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Proposed Rules to the legislative branch.
43
  Upon receipt of the Proposed 
Rules, “[i]nfluential members of Congress were displeased with the 
Supreme Court’s inclusion of a date on which the rules would 
automatically become effective in the absence of congressional 
disapproval.”
44
  Due to the perceived “highhandedness” of the Court, the 
Proposed Rules spent the next two years working their way through 
various congressional committees and subcommittees, until President 




Based on this history, an early commentator who was intimately 
familiar with the Rules stated, “While controversial, this residual 
exception is not likely to be dramatically significant.  The preconditions 
are onerous but beyond that, it is quite difficult to think of many 
trustworthy types of hearsay that are not already adequately covered by 
the traditional exceptions to the rule against hearsay.”
46
  Subsequent 
history has profoundly called that prediction into question. 
                                                          
 43.  See Waltz, supra note 30, at 348–49 (discussing the Rules’ progression through Congress). 
 44.  Id. at 348. 
 45.  See id. at 348–49 (“It is accurate to say that the rules ultimately approved by Congress and 
signed into law by the President are essentially the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, with 
some important exceptions dictated in the main by Congress’ disagreement with the Advisory 
Committee’s assessment of the significance of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, and, regrettably, with 
a few vexing drafting errors.” (footnotes omitted)).  The residual exception’s history was thoroughly 
explained in a 1979 Congressional Research Service report: 
When the federal rules were considered by the House . . . both sections 803(24) and 
804(b)(6) . . . were deleted.  The reasons for this action were stated . . . to be that these 
rules injected too much uncertainty into the law of evidence and impaired the ability of 
practitioners to prepare for trial. . . .  The Senate, when it took the House passed bill 
under consideration, reinstated both rules but with changes and additions.  The 
requirement of “comparable” circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness was changed 
to “equivalent” guarantees . . . were added.  The Senate amendments to these rules were 
accepted by the Committee of Conference but only after it incorporated additional 
requirements concerning prior notice of intent to introduce the evidence.  It is rather clear 
from the Conference Report . . . and from discussions on the floor of the House . . . that 
this addition was a compromise to provide the counsel against whom such evidence may 
be offered a fair opportunity through prior notice to prepare to object to the evidence, to 
contest its admissibility, and to meet it should it be admitted. 
MURL A. LARKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REP. NO. 79-94, RESIDUAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
HEARSAY RULE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 3–4 (1979).  
 46.  Waltz, supra note 30, at 364.  See S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 20 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7066 (“The committee does not intend to establish a broad license for trial 
judges to admit hearsay statements that do not fall within one of the other exceptions. . . .  It is 
intended that . . . the trial judge will exercise no less care, reflection and caution than the courts did 
under the common law.”); see also Waltz, supra note 30, at 346–50 (examining the legislative 
history of the Rules of Evidence); Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 872–75 (examining the 
legislative history of the residual exception specifically). 
722 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
B.  Rule 807 and the Judicial Liberalization of the Residual Exception 
As explained by the Supreme Court in 1990, “The residual hearsay 
exception . . . accommodates ad hoc instances in which statements not 
otherwise falling within a recognized hearsay exception might 
nevertheless be sufficiently reliable to be admissible at trial.”
47
  The 
exception, which applies irrespective of the availability of the hearsay 
declarant, is currently found at Federal Rule of Evidence 807, which 
reads as follows: 
Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement is not excluded 
by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not specifically 
covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804: (1) the statement 
has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) it is 
offered as evidence of a material fact; (3) it is more probative on the 
point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent 
can obtain through reasonable efforts; and (4) admitting it will best 
serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice.
48
 
Additionally, the notice provision of the Rule provides that a 
“statement is admissible only if, before the trial or hearing, the proponent 
gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer the 
statement . . . so that the party has a fair opportunity to meet it.”
49
 
The residual exception, as originally enacted by Congress, was 
intended to embody the Dallas County court’s rationale—subject to 
subsequent fine-tuning by the Advisory Committee and eventually the 
Senate and House Committees.
50
  Many courts cite the language from the 
legislative history that the rule was intended to “be used very rarely, and 
only in exceptional circumstances,”
51
 but nevertheless end up using the 
residual exception to freely admit hearsay that fails to fit within a 
categorical exception for statements clearly contemplated by Congress.
52
  
                                                          
 47.  Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990). 
 48.  FED. R. EVID. 807(a). 
 49.  FED. R. EVID. 807(b). 
 50.  Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 871–75.  
 51.  S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 20, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7066.  See, for example, 
United States v. Bailey’s discussion of the Senate Committee report. 581 F.2d 341, 346–47 (3d Cir. 
1978).  
 52.  E.g., United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882, 893 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Congress intended the 
residual hearsay exception to ‘be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances’ . . . .” 
(quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 20, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7066)); United Techs. 
Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (“‘Congress intended the residual hearsay 
exception to be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances,’ and it ‘appl[ies] only when 
certain exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness exist and when high degrees of probativeness and 
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This trend began shortly after the Federal Rules went into effect.  
Interestingly enough, in 1976, Judge Weinstein authored two of the 
earliest residual-exception cases while serving as judge sitting in the 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
53
  As a member of 
the Advisory Committee who penned the rules, his liberal, well-reasoned 
interpretation of the residual exception was difficult for the Second 
Circuit to refute, and it eventually set the stage for a debate regarding the 
proper interpretation of the residual exception (at least within the Second 
Circuit).
54
  Over the years, various jurisdictions have abandoned the 
exceptional-circumstances ideal in favor of a far more liberal approach to 
residual hearsay than that originally prescribed by Congress.  For 
instance, the narrow exception Congress envisioned is a far cry from the 
Ninth Circuit’s articulation of the exception as one that “exists to provide 
courts with flexibility in admitting statements traditionally regarded as 
hearsay but not falling within any of the conventional exceptions.”
55
 
As observed by Professor Roger C. Park, “the consensus of scholarly 
opinion seems to be that courts construing the residual exceptions have 
been quite liberal in finding evidence trustworthy enough to be 
received.”
56
  And the reason for this appears obvious: while the 
                                                          
necessity are present.’” (citations omitted)). 
 53.  United States v. Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554, 558–60 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff’d, 540 F.2d 574 
(2d Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), 
aff’d, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 54.  Compare Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp. at 559 (“In addition, ‘the general purposes of these rules 
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.’  There is 
a clear conflict of credibility.  The jury was entitled to all the help available on the point.” (citation 
omitted) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(24)(C))), with United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309, 315 (2d 
Cir. 1977) (“The Committee Advisory Note points out that the cases reveal a hesitancy to admit the 
statement without more when the bystander’s identity is unknown.  This may well be the reason 
Judge Weinstein decided to rely on Rule 804(b)(5).  That fact, however, that the statement meets all 
the specific standards for admissions under 803(1) but fails to meet all the criteria set forth in the 
supportive judicial rationale surely brings it within the grant of discretion which 804(b)(5) accords to 
a trial judge, consonant with the legislative purposes which the residual exception was designed to 
achieve.” (citation omitted)).  Compare Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp. at 560 (“Although notice was not 
given in advance of trial, as required by the language of the Rule, allowance must be made for 
situations like this in which the need did not become apparent until after the trial had commenced.”), 
with United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 73 n.30 (2d Cir. 1977) (“Our examination of the 
congressional debates further discloses that the requirement that notice be given in advance of trial 
was the method selected by the Committee of Conference to prevent abuse of FRE 803(24) and 
804(b)(5).”). 
 55.  United States v. Valdez-Soto, 31 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 56.  Park, supra note 1, at 651–52 (footnote omitted); see also Beaver, supra note 1, at 790–91 
(“The residual hearsay exceptions threaten to swallow the hearsay rule.  Since 1975, the use of Rules 
803(24) and 804(b)(5), and their state equivalents, have been reported in more than 140 federal cases 
and in more than ninety state cases.  Contrary to the intent of Congress, these figures suggest that the 
catchall exceptions are being used more generally than in rare and exceptional circumstances.” 
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applicability of the exception in varying circumstances is a frequent 
subject of debate, it is undoubtedly clear that the residual exception 
grants district court judges a tremendous amount of discretion to admit 
evidence that would not otherwise qualify under a specific hearsay 
exception laid out in Rule 803 or 804.
57
  For instance, more than thirty 
years after the rule was enacted, the Ninth Circuit observed that “[o]ur 
research has disclosed only one instance where a circuit court reversed a 
district court to require admission of a statement under FRE 807.”
58
  This 
deference has led to an interesting patchwork of residual exception case 
law, whereby the admissibility of hearsay evidence in any given case 
varies from federal court to federal court based on the peculiar approach 
followed in a particular jurisdiction.  Indeed, U.S. Circuit Courts of 
Appeals have even carved out specific, categorical types of out-of-court 
statements that are routinely introduced under the residual exception—
including, bank records and other business records,
59
 plea agreements to 
ponzi schemes,
60
 statements made in furtherance of conspiracies,
61
 and 
testimony given by child witnesses.
62
 
Against this backdrop of differing conclusions on the meaning of the 
residual exception’s elements among jurisdictions, as well as differing 
judicial philosophies regarding the proper scope of the exception,
63
 Part 
                                                          
(footnotes omitted)). 
 57.  Courts review decisions to admit evidence under the residual exception for abuse of 
discretion, or clear error.  Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306, 1312 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 267 (2015).  That standard of review, coupled with the harmless error doctrine, 
makes a successful appellate challenge to the admission of evidence under the residual exception 
exceedingly rare. See, e.g., id. (noting that courts are “particularly hesitant to overturn a trial court’s 
admissibility ruling under the residual hearsay exception absent a ‘definite and firm conviction that 
the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the 
relevant factors.’” (quoting Balogh’s of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 
1986))); see also Todd J. Bruno, Say What?? Confusion in the Courts over What Is the Proper 
Standard of Review for Hearsay Rulings, 18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 20 (2013) (stating 
that “many courts still apply the ‘abuse of discretion’ rubber stamp”). 
 58.  United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 501 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Sanchez-
Lima, 161 F.3d 545, 547–48 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
 59.  E.g., United States v. Simmons, 773 F.2d 1455, 1458 (4th Cir. 1985) (discussing use of 
trace forms as a business record exception to the hearsay rule); infra notes 110–17 and 
accompanying text.  
 60.  See infra notes 272–81 and accompanying text.  
 61.  See, e.g., United States v. Hitsman, 604 F.2d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1979) (discussing 
statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy). 
 62.  “Courts have employed the exception most extensively in admitting statements made by 
child witnesses, particularly in sexual abuse cases.” 2 KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 324 (7th ed. 2013). 
 63.  In an interesting concurring opinion, Judge Richard Posner advocated for adopting an 
approach to the admission of hearsay that greatly expands the role of the residual exception. See 
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III of this Article explores the elements of the residual exception. 
III.  PREVAILING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE 
RESIDUAL EXCEPTION 
The residual exception allows for the admission of hearsay that 
would not otherwise fall within one of the specific Rule 803 or 804 
exceptions to the hearsay rule, so long as the out-of-court statement 
offered into evidence meets the basic requirements listed in Rule 807. 
First, the out-of-court statement must possess “equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”
64
  This is referred to as the 
trustworthiness requirement.  Second, the statement must be “offered as 
evidence of a material fact.”
65
  Because the Federal Rules of Evidence 
make relevance a prerequisite to the admission of hearsay statements—
and all evidence for that matter—this prong has been referred to as 
“redundant” and does not appear to carry much weight.
66
  Third, the 
statement must be “more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable 
                                                          
Jeffrey Bellin, The Case for eHearsay, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1325–26 (2014) (discussing 
Judge Posner’s proposal).  This approach is similar to the approach advocated for by Judge 
Weinstein during his time on the Advisory Committee.  Id. at 1326.  In a sense, Posner’s proposal 
would make Rule 807 the primary gatekeeper of whether hearsay is reliable, rather than only coming 
into play when one of the exceptions in Rules 801 to 806 cannot be satisfied.  Specifically, Judge 
Posner proposed the following:  
What I would like to see is Rule 807 (“Residual Exception”) swallow much of Rules 801 
through 806 and thus many of the exclusions from evidence, exceptions to the exclusions, 
and notes of the Advisory Committee.  The “hearsay rule” is too complex, as well as 
being archaic.  Trials would go better with a simpler rule, the core of which would be the 
proposition (essentially a simplification of Rule 807) that hearsay evidence should be 
admissible when it is reliable, when the jury can understand its strengths and limitations, 
and when it will materially enhance the likelihood of a correct outcome.  
United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring). 
 64.  FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(1).  
 65.  FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(2).  
 66.  See Elizabeth DeCoux, Textual Limits on the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule: The 
“Near Miss” Debate and Beyond, 35 S.U. L. REV. 99, 101–02 (2007) (observing that the materiality 
requirement is redundant, “given that Rules 401 and 402, taken together, provide that 
evidence which is not material is inadmissible”).  Shortly after the residual exception was enacted, 
Judge Weinstein observed that the materiality requirement “appears to be redundant in light of the 
requirement in the Fed. R. Evid. that all evidence be relevant, relating to ‘a fact of consequence to 
the determination of the action.’” Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 874 n.46.  Judge Weinstein 
hypothesized, “What is probably meant is that the exception should not be used for trivial or 
collateral matters.”  United States v. Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554, 559 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 540 F.2d 574 
(2d Cir. 1976).  Hawaii specifically omitted the materiality requirement from its state-law residual 
exception, despite copying the federal rule in all other respects. See infra Appendix. 




  This is referred to as the probativeness requirement.  Fourth, 
admitting the statement must also “best serve the purposes of these rules 
and the interests of justice.”
68
  This interests-of-justice requirement, 
while not as divisive as the probativeness and trustworthiness 
requirements, has raised interesting questions regarding the propriety of 
admitting hearsay statements in criminal proceedings subject to the limits 
of the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
69
  Lastly, “before 
the trial or hearing,” the offering party must “give[] an adverse party 
reasonable notice of the intent to offer the statement and its 
particulars . . . so that the party has a fair opportunity to meet it.”
70
  This 
is referred to as the notice requirement.  The following Parts of this 
Article, in turn, address the varying interpretations of each of the 
requirements of the residual exception. 
A. Trustworthiness 
Evidence admitted under the residual exception must be trustworthy; 
more specifically it must possess “circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness” equivalent to the established hearsay exceptions found 
in Rules 803 and 804.
71
  Federal courts consider a variety of factors when 
determining whether hearsay is sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted 
under the residual exception.  In Rivers v. United States, Judge Eduardo 
Robreno,
72
 sitting by designation with the Eleventh Circuit, thoroughly 
examined the varying approaches to trustworthiness in federal courts.
73
  
                                                          
 67.  FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(3). 
 68.  FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(4). 
 69.  While the interests-of-justice requirement at times raises interesting discussions of 
constitutional law, the requirement is also arguably redundant:  
[T]he statement must serve the purposes of the rules of evidence and 
the interests of justice—also somewhat redundant, given the requirements of Rule 102 
that all the rules should be construed to secure “fairness in administration and promotion 
of the growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be 
ascertained and proceedings justly determined.” 
DeCoux, supra note 66, at 102.  Accordingly, this Article primarily focuses on the probativeness, 
trustworthiness, and notice requirements of the residual exception. See infra Part III. 
 70.  FED. R. EVID. 807(b).  
 71.  FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(1); see Anthony Bocchino & David Sonenshein, Rule 804(B)(6)—The 
Illegitimate Child of the Failed Liaison Between the Hearsay Rule and Confrontation Clause, 73 
MO. L. REV. 41, 72 (2008) (“The residual exception of Rule 807, as did its predecessor rules, invites 
the trial judge to engage in a kind of balancing that implicates both the necessity and trustworthiness 
of the proposed evidence.  That balancing is most likely to result in a fair determination of the 
admissibility of statements for which no specific exception exists.”). 
 72.  Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
 73.  777 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 267 (2015). 
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Judge Robreno detailed some of the prevailing trustworthiness 
considerations federal courts consider: (1) “the circumstances in which 
the declarant made the statement and the incentive he had to speak 
truthfully or falsely;” (2) “the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the making of the statement and those rendering the declarant 
particularly worthy of belief;” (3) “whether the declarant had ‘clear 
motivation’ to lie or mislead;” and (4) “whether the statement concerned 
facts of which the declarant had personal knowledge.”
74
  He observed 
that courts in the Seventh Circuit, in addition to considering the 
declarant’s motivation, knowledge, and qualifications, also consider “the 
existence of corroborating evidence.”
75
  In light of these factors, and the 
following cases, the federal courts appear to take a holistic approach to 
trustworthiness, focusing primarily, but not exclusively, on the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement offered under the 
residual exception. 
Case law demonstrates that there are differing jurisdiction-specific 
views on what is required for evidence to be sufficiently trustworthy to 
be admitted pursuant to Rule 807.  The requirement has also raised some 
interesting legal debates.  For instance, does the introduction of evidence 
that corroborates the residual hearsay suffice to make the proffered out-
of-court statement trustworthy?
76
  Alternatively, should courts confine 
their trustworthiness analysis by examining only the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the statement?
77
  Finally, if a proffered 
hearsay statement meets most, but not all, of the requirements to satisfy 
one of the established hearsay exceptions, can it be admitted as 
“equivalent” under the “near-miss” theory of the residual exception?
78
 
1. Corroboration and the Confrontation Clause 
Residual Exceptions examined the difference between ascertaining 
trustworthiness by examining the circumstances surrounding the making 
of an out-of-court statement and by examining extrinsic guarantees of 
trustworthiness.
79
  After analyzing the breadth of residual exception case 
                                                          
 74.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 75.  Id. (citing United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1111 (7th Cir. 1999)).  See infra Part 
III.A.1 for a discussion of corroboration. 
 76.  See infra Part III.A.1. 
 77.  See infra Part III.A.2. 
 78.  See infra Part III.A.3. 
 79.  See generally Residual Exceptions, supra note 1. 
728 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
law, the author identified three prevailing tests for examining 
trustworthiness: (1) “[o]ne test measures trustworthiness at the time of 
trial by analyzing only factors extrinsic to the evidence itself;”
80
 (2) “[a] 
second standard considers the circumstances surrounding the making of 
the out-of-court statement as well as extrinsic corroboration to determine 
the reliability of the hearsay;”
81
 and (3) “[a] third standard looks only to 
the circumstances surrounding the making of the out-of-court statement 
and does not consider extrinsic corroboration to gauge trustworthiness.”
82
  
Ultimately, Residual Exceptions posited that the third standard was the 
only one that could be squared with the history of the residual exception, 
concluding that “[c]orroborating evidence . . . should not be a factor in 
the analysis” because, as with all of the historical, categorical exceptions, 
“only the circumstances of the making should be considered in 
determining whether hearsay is admissible under the residual 
exceptions.”
83
  In the years that have followed there has been 
considerable debate regarding the relevance of corroboration evidence 
when determining the trustworthiness of hearsay evidence. 
Moreover, Residual Exceptions pointed out a basic and rather 
obvious reason as to why it is inappropriate to consider corroboration in 
the residual exception calculus—if there is corroboration, then there is no 
significant need for the purported residual hearsay since there is other 
evidence available on point.
84
  If there is corroboration, the probativeness 
requirement of Rule 807 is not met unless the proffered hearsay is the 
most probative evidence available on the point for which it is offered.  
Therefore, if a court chooses to use corroboration as a trustworthiness 
metric, then it must indulge in a weighing process to determine that the 
proffered hearsay is somehow more probative than the corroboration.  To 
date, no court that has used corroboration to demonstrate trustworthiness 
has ever weighed the probative value of the hearsay against the probative 
value of the corroboration.  As Dallas County and Rule 807 have made 
clear, admissible residual hearsay must be both reliable and necessary.  
Corroboration, by definition, cuts against necessity. 
                                                          
 80. Id. at 876.  “Several factors are frequently cited in support of findings that circumstances at 
the time of trial provide guarantees of trustworthiness.  (1) The availability of the declarant[;] (2) 
[c]orroboration of the statement by other evidence[; and] (3) [t]he declarant’s admission at trial of 
having made the hearsay statement.”  Id. at 876 n.55 (citations omitted). 
 81.  Id. at 876–77; see also id. at 881–83. 
 82.  Id. at 877; see also id. at 883–85; Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 292 (7th Cir. 
1979) (discussing elements needed to make evidence trustworthy). 
 83.  Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 884.  
 84.  Id. at 879–80. 
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The Supreme Court took the opportunity to discuss corroboration 
evidence in Idaho v. Wright,
85
 albeit in a slightly different context.  
Given the relatively unchecked discretion granted to district judges to 
admit evidence under the residual exception, the Supreme Court has 
rarely had the opportunity to clarify its scope and meaning.  The Court 
has, however, interpreted the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment, which imposes substantive limitations on the introduction 
of hearsay evidence in criminal trials.  In Wright, the Court addressed 
those constitutional restrictions on the admission of certain out-of-court 
statements against a criminal defendant, holding that they must bear 
“indicia of reliability.”
86
 Indicia of reliability is evidence that either “falls 
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or possesses “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.”
87
  This second exception is similar to the 
“circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” required under Rule 807, 
yet it is more stringent; the Confrontation Clause “bars the admission of 
some evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an exception to 
the hearsay rule.”
88
  Ultimately, the Court held that hearsay statements of 
a child victim lacked the necessary “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness” to satisfy Confrontation Clause scrutiny.
89
 
In dicta, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to discuss the 
trustworthiness of evidence admitted under the residual exception.  The 
Supreme Court explained that, “almost by definition,” out-of-court 
statements that are admitted under the residual exception, “do not share 
the same tradition of reliability that supports the admissibility of 
                                                          
 85.  497 U.S. 805 (1990).  
 86.  Id. at 822.  The indicia-of-reliability standard for the admission of hearsay under the 
Confrontation Clause was originally announced in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  Of note, 
in 2004 the Court overruled the indicia-of-reliability standard announced in Roberts.  Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004) (“[T]he only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy 
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”).  The Court 
in Crawford held the constitutional right to confrontation prevents testimonial hearsay statements 
from being introduced against a criminal defendant unless the witness is unavailable and the 
defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.  Id. at 53–54; see also Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. 
Ct. 2173, 2179 (2015) (discussing the standard post-Crawford).  While the standard originally 
announced in Ohio v. Roberts no longer prevails, the Court’s discussion of how to discern the 
trustworthiness of hearsay is useful when assessing the proper scope and meaning of the residual 
exception. 
 87.  Wright, 497 U.S. at 815 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).  
 88.  Id. at 814.  The Court has been “careful not to equate the Confrontation Clause’s 
prohibitions with the general rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay statements,” meaning the 
Sixth Amendment. Id.  
 89.  Id. at 827. 
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statements under a firmly rooted hearsay exception.”
90
  The Court’s 
approach in Wright exemplifies a preference for examining the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the making of a statement when 
determining its trustworthiness.  In particular, the Court offered the 
following example to illustrate the problem with using corroborating 
evidence to prove trustworthiness: 
A statement made under duress . . . may happen to be a true statement, 
but the circumstances under which it is made . . . may even be such that 
the declarant is particularly unlikely to be telling the truth.  In such a 
case, cross-examination at trial would be highly useful to probe the 
declarant’s state of mind when he made the statements; . . . evidence 
tending to corroborate the truth of the statement would be no substitute 
for cross-examination of the declarant at trial.
91
 
This example illustrates that relying on corroborating evidence is 
often inconsistent with the underlying requirement that hearsay be 
inherently trustworthy.  The Court also identified another flaw in using 
corroborating evidence to prove the trustworthiness of the circumstances 
surrounding the making of an out-of-court statement—bootstrapping 
(i.e., the process of admitting hearsay evidence based on previously 
admitted hearsay).
92
  In light of these concerns, the Court expressly 
rejected the use of corroborating evidence to show particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness under the Confrontation Clause.
93
  
Nonetheless, as explained in the following Part, both state and federal 
courts differ widely on the weight they afford corroborating evidence 
when admitting residual hearsay.
94
 
                                                          
 90.  Id. at 817. 
 91.  Id. at 822–23. 
   92.  Id. at 823 (“[T]he use of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay statement’s 
‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ would permit admission of a presumptively unreliable 
statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial . . . .”). 
 93.  Id. at 819 (“We agree that ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ must be shown 
from the totality of the circumstances, but we think the relevant circumstances include only those 
that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of 
belief.”). 
 94.  See, e.g., United States v. Mokol, 939 F.2d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[I]n cases where the 
testimony is offered for a limited purpose, corroboration need not be great.  But where the testimony 
is critical to the case, the trial court may require a high degree of corroboration.” (citations omitted)); 
United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 1978) (“[T]he trustworthiness of a statement 
should be analyzed by evaluating not only the facts corroborating the veracity of the statement, but 
also the circumstances in which the declarant made the statement and the incentive he had to speak 
truthfully or falsely.”); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1135 (4th Cir. 1978) (“The 
corroborative circumstances and verification procedures lend to his grand jury testimony a degree of 
trustworthiness probably substantially exceeding that inherent in dying declarations, statements 
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2. Totality of the Circumstances Approach to Determining 
Trustworthiness Under the Residual Exception 
Aside from the constitutional constraint on the introduction of 
hearsay against a criminal defendant, there is no prohibition on the 
consideration of corroborating evidence under Rule 807.  Nonetheless, 
following the Supreme Court’s lead in Wright, many courts have been 
suspicious of the use of corroborating evidence to prove circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness.  This is due in part to the fact that the use 
of corroborating evidence to find residual hearsay sufficiently 
trustworthy is internally inconsistent with the probativeness requirement 
of the residual exception.
95
  The probativeness requirement generally 
assumes a lack of corroboration—thus creating the need to rely on the 
residual exception.  If evidence is introduced at trial that corroborates the 
substance of hearsay offered under the residual exception, that evidence 
also tends to cut against the notion that the hearsay should come in under 
the residual exception because it is “more probative.”  For this reason, 
and as explained in Residual Exceptions, the view most consistent with 
the language of the Rule requires that the trustworthiness analysis be 




Among the states that have a residual hearsay exception in their rules 
of evidence, the prevailing state-law approach to determining 
trustworthiness is for the trial court to take a holistic approach, 
considering a variety of factors in light of all of the evidence.  In some 
states these factors are expressly mandated by statute, while in others, 
trustworthiness is a term of art developed through judicial gloss.  These 
factors often vary, but state courts generally engage in a fact-specific 
                                                          
against interest, and statements of personal or family history . . . .”); United States v. McGrath, 39 
M.J. 158, 166 (C.M.A. 1994) (“We have previously sided with those courts holding that 
corroboration by other evidence is one of the means by which hearsay evidence can be tested for 
trustworthiness.”).  
 95.  See Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 883 (“[A]ny view of trustworthiness which 
utilizes corroboration to measure trustworthiness under the residual exceptions misconstrues the 
rule.”). 
 96.  Id. at 883 (citing Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979), as an example 
of this approach to trustworthiness); see also Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306, 1314–15 (11th 
Cir. 2015) (“By requiring hearsay admitted under the residual exception to have circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness that are like the guarantees of the specific exceptions, Rule 807 is 
clearly concerned, first and foremost, about whether the declarant originally made the statements 
under circumstances that render the statements more trustworthy.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 267 
(2015). 
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inquiry looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
making of the out-of-court statement when assessing trustworthiness.
97
  
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, like other state courts, has also stressed 
the importance of examining the nature of the statement itself.
98
  
However, other courts, like the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, 
have instructed trial courts to consider “facts corroborating the veracity 
of the statement, circumstances in which the declarant made the 
statement and the incentive he or she had to speak truthfully or falsely.”
99
  
Of note, it seems that many states allow corroboration to be considered 
when determining trustworthiness under the residual exception; however, 
they only do so within the bounds of Wright and as one of multiple 
factors.
100
  In state court, corroboration is still available to demonstrate 
trustworthiness for residual exception purposes, as part of a totality-of-
the-circumstances approach to trustworthiness. 
Likewise, the Military Commissions Act of 2009 expressly instructs 
military judges to consider corroboration in determining the admissibility 
of residual hearsay at military proceedings.  For an out-of-court 
statement to be admitted at military proceedings, a military judge must 
“tak[e] into account all of the circumstances surrounding the taking of 
the statement, including the degree to which the statement is 
corroborated, the indicia of reliability within the statement itself, and 
whether the will of the declarant was overborne.”
101
  In light of those 
considerations, the court must make four affirmative findings: 
(I) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;  
(II) the statement is probative on the point for which it is offered; 
(III) direct testimony from the witness is not available as a practical 
matter, taking into consideration the physical location of the witness, 
                                                          
 97.  See infra Part IV for a survey of state approaches to the residual exception. 
 98.  State v. Phillips, 840 N.W.2d 500, 518 (Neb. 2013) (considering (1) “whether the statement 
is oral or written”; (2) “whether a declarant had a motive to speak truthfully or untruthfully, which 
may involve an examination of the declarant’s partiality and the relationship between the declarant 
and the witness;” (3) “whether the statement was made under oath”; (4) “whether the statement was 
spontaneous or in response to a leading question or questions”; (5) “whether a declarant was subject 
to cross-examination when the statement was made”; and (6) “whether a declarant has subsequently 
reaffirmed or recanted the statement.”).  
 99.  West v. State, 798 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 12, § 2804.1 (West 2009). 
 100.  See infra note 400 for Colorado’s and North Carolina’s residual-exception, trustworthiness 
factors, which both consider corroboration.  
 101.  10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(3)(D)(ii) (2012). 
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the unique circumstances of military and intelligence operations during 
hostilities, and the adverse impacts on military or intelligence 
operations that would likely result from the production of the witness; 
and 
(IV) the general purposes of the rules of evidence and the interests of 




Interestingly enough, while mirroring the federal rule in many 
regards, Congress chose to exclude any mention of “equivalent 
guarantees of trustworthiness” from the military tribunal’s residual 
exception but explicitly added “corroboration.”
103 
For instance, in United States v. Turner, the Third Circuit adopted a 
somewhat cautious approach to using corroboration evidence to satisfy 
the Rule 807 trustworthiness requirement.
104
  Specifically, the court 
addressed whether corroborating evidence can be used to prove whether 
hearsay contained in a document can be admitted under the residual 
exception.
105
  After observing that trustworthiness is a “highly fact-
specific inquiry,”
106
 the court affirmatively stated that a “district court 
may not rely exclusively on corroborating evidence” when determining a 
document’s trustworthiness under Rule 807.
107
  Though Rule 807 is less 
restrictive than the Confrontation Clause when it comes to corroborating 
evidence, courts still acknowledge the concerns inherent in using 
corroboration evidence to prove trustworthiness.
108
 
Despite the semi-bright-line rule prohibiting exclusive reliance on 
corroboration evidence announced in Turner, the Third Circuit still 
managed to carve out a category of hearsay that is inherently trustworthy.  
                                                          
 102.  Id. § 949a(b)(3)(D)(ii)(I)–(IV). 
 103.  Id. § 949a(b)(3)(D)(ii).  The Military Commissions Act also contains a notice provision:  
the proponent of the evidence makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance 
to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to meet the evidence, the proponent’s 
intention to offer the evidence, and the particulars of the evidence (including information 
on the circumstances under which the evidence was obtained). 
Id. § 949a(b)(3)(D)(i). 
 104.  United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 233–35 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 105.  Id. at 233. 
 106.  Id. (citing United States v. Wright, 363 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2004)).  
 107.  Id. at 233–34 (emphasis added). 
 108.  Compare id. (proscribing only exclusive dependence on corroborating evidence), with 
United States v. Mokol, 939 F.2d 436, 439–40 (7th Cir. 1991) (tying required amount of 
corroborating evidence to importance of hearsay testimony). 
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Turner was charged with conspiracy to defraud the IRS.
109
  At trial, the 
district court used Rule 807 to admit a variety of bank records that were 
seized from a co-conspirator’s office.
110
  Turner challenged the 
admission of the documents, arguing that the government did not prove 
trustworthiness because the declarants were unknown.
111
  He also argued 
that the court improperly relied on corroborating evidence alone when 
holding that the records possessed circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness.
112
  In upholding the district court’s decision to admit the 
records, the Third Circuit reasoned that bank records “provide 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness because the banks and their 
customers rely on their accuracy in the course of their business.”
113
  The 
court in Turner seemed to imply that bank records could come in under 
Rule 807 because they are inherently trustworthy.  Of note, the Turner 
court also stressed that the district court had relied on more than just 




The admission of bank records and similar business documents under 
the residual exception appears to be a growing trend.  Outside the Third 
Circuit, other federal circuit courts have upheld the admission of bank 
records under the residual exception.  While Turner involved domestic 
bank records, the Fifth Circuit held that foreign bank records are also 
inherently trustworthy due to customer reliance on their accuracy.
115
  In 
both of these cases the records were admitted under Rule 807 because, 
for one reason or another, they could not meet the business records 
exception in Rule 803(6).
116
  In fact, the First Circuit even upheld the 
                                                          
 109.  Turner, 718 F.3d at 228, 230. 
 110.  Id. at 229–30. 
 111.  Id. at 234. 
 112.  Id.  The Third Circuit’s clear-error standard of review, id. at 233, seems inconsistent with 
other circuits that review Rule 807 decisions using an abuse-of-discretion standard. See, e.g., United 
States v. Wilson, 249 F.3d 366, 374–75 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We review evidentiary rulings of the 
district court for abuse of discretion.” (citing United States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 
2000))), abrogated on other grounds by Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005). 
 113.  Turner, 718 F.3d at 234 (quoting United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 202 (3d Cir. 
1992)).  
 114.  Id. at 235.  According to the court, the district court also considered “(1) the appearance of 
the records, including their internal consistency; (2) the contents of the records; and (3) the 
circumstances surrounding the discovery of the records.” Id. 
 115.  Wilson, 249 F.3d at 374–76. 
 116.  See Karme v. Comm’r, 673 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that despite the fact 
“documents were not brought within the Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) ‘business records’ exception to the 
hearsay rule because Lynch was not a ‘custodian or other qualified witness’ . . . Fed. R. Evid. 
803(24) [the prior residual exception] provides another exception to the hearsay rule.”).  
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admission of a bank record under the residual exception despite stating 
unequivocally that “the district court acted under the ‘wrong’ rule”—
meaning that the documents should not have been admitted under the 
business records exception.
117
  In a sense, in the event that bank records 
cannot be admitted under the business records exception, district judges 
still can do no wrong by admitting bank records under the residual 
exception. 
While the corroboration debate continues, the foregoing cases 
demonstrate that corroboration should not be the key to the 
trustworthiness determination.
118
  In deciding on trustworthiness, federal 
courts are generally more concerned with the circumstances surrounding 
the making of a statement than corroborating evidence.  In that sense, the 
Rule 807 trustworthiness analysis usually reflects case-by-case analysis 
of the facts surrounding the statement based on common sense reliability 
considerations.  For instance, in United Technologies Corp. v. Mazer, a 
case involving a conspiracy to steal confidential airplane-engine 
blueprints, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the trustworthiness of 
“unsworn, unattested statements” made in a government investigative 
report under the residual exception.
119
  The Eleventh Circuit upheld the 
district court’s ruling that the statements were inadmissible under the 
residual exception.
120
  After observing that Congress intended Rule 807 
to be “used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances,”
121
 the 
court examined the trustworthiness requirement in the case before it.
122
  
The court noted that despite the fact that the declarant had submitted to a 
government interview under a proffer agreement, any declarant that is 
the target of a criminal investigation has “ample motivation to implicate 
others (even falsely).”
123
  The court accordingly held that the hearsay 
                                                          
 117.  United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1127 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Santa Barbara 
Capital Mgmt. v. Nielson (In re Slatkin), 525 F.3d 805, 811–13 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding the 
introduction of a plea agreement to participation in a ponzi scheme in a civil case suing the 
proponent of the scheme under Rule 807 despite the district court’s failure to specify which hearsay 
exception applied). 
 118.  Contra Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir.) (citing a lack of 
corroborating evidence to support the holding that certain statements “lack equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness and that it was error for the district court to admit them under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 807”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 267 (2015). 
 119.  United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. (quoting United States v. Ingram, 501 F.3d 963, 967 (8th Cir. 2007), vacated by 555 
U.S. 1132 (2009)). 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id.; see also United States v. Dent, 984 F.2d 1453, 1460 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Nor do we find 
that Dent’s exculpatory statements made to his lawyer have any ‘guarantees of trustworthiness’ as 
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United States v. Bonds, a Ninth Circuit case, also demonstrates the 
practical totality approach employed by courts when examining 
trustworthiness under the residual exception.
125
  There, the defendant was 
Barry Lamar Bonds, Major League Baseball’s all-time career home run 
leader, who was prosecuted by the federal government for perjury after 
testifying under oath that he had never taken steroids.
126
  In order to 
prove its case, the government had to prove that the steroid-positive 
blood and urine samples it had recovered from the now-infamous 
BALCO laboratories actually belonged to Bonds.
127
  The government 
had recovered BALCO records confirming that the samples belonged to 
Bonds.
128
  Originally the government sought to prove its case with the 
records, and by calling Bonds’s trainer, Greg Anderson, who had 
allegedly brought the samples to BALCO.
129
  Ultimately, because 
Anderson refused to testify (and went to jail for contempt),
130
 the 
government was forced to prove its case through a BALCO employee 
who allegedly received the samples from Anderson and who would 
testify to that effect.
131
  The district court ruled that Anderson’s out-of-
court statements could not be admitted to establish the truth of the matter 
they asserted—that the positive blood samples were in fact drawn from 
Bonds, which leads to the conclusion that Bonds lied when he testified 
                                                          
required for admission under this rule.” (citing United States v. Romo, 914 F.2d 889, 896 (7th Cir. 
1990))), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 124.  Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1279. 
 125.  United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 500–02 (9th Cir. 2009). 
   126.  Id. at 497.  This is the same Barry Bonds who hit the peak of his career in his late thirties, 
and whose head and chest grew exponentially during the later half of his career (circumstantial 
evidence, of course).  
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id. at 498. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  For baseball fans who followed the Bonds saga, the case has a fascinating statement of 
facts.  For instance, the court observed the following about Bonds’s relationship with Anderson: 
Bonds admitted to paying Anderson $15,000 a year for training.  Bonds stated that this 
payment was not formally agreed to.  Rather, Bonds contended that he “felt guilty” and 
“at least [wanted to give Anderson] something.” . . . [Bonds] considered Anderson a 
friend whom he paid for his help. . . . Bonds made his payments to Anderson in lump 
sums.  In 2001, the year he set the Major League Baseball single season home run record, 
Bonds also provided Anderson, along with other friends and associates, a “gift” of 
$20,000. 
Id. at 499.  Maybe not so coincidently, Anderson was imprisoned on contempt charges when he 
refused to testify against Bonds.  
 131.  Id. at 498. 
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before a grand jury that he had never ingested steroids.
132
  As a result of 
that ruling, the court held that the BALCO log sheets that showed 
Bonds’s name on the samples were also inadmissible hearsay.
133
  The 




The Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the residual exception appears 
much more liberal than that of the Eleventh Circuit in Mazer.
135
  The 
Bonds court began by observing that Rule 807 “provide[s] judges a ‘fair 
degree of latitude’ and ‘flexibility’ to admit statements that would 
otherwise be hearsay.”
136
  Nonetheless, when considering the 
trustworthiness of Anderson’s statements, the court used practical 
considerations to distinguish those statements from hearsay previously 
held to be trustworthy under the residual exception.  The court first 
observed that, unlike in other cases, Anderson’s statements were not 
videotaped and under oath, which made them far less trustworthy.
137
  
Further, the court noted that, unlike residual-exception cases where 
statements were admitted because the declarant was truly unavailable,
138
 
there were no “exceptional” circumstances that rendered Anderson’s 
statements absolutely necessary.
139
  The court reasoned that the 
circumstances did not render it admissible under the residual exception 
“because it involves statements of an unavailable witness like those FRE 
                                                          
 132.  Id. at 500.  
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 498. 
 135.  Compare United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(upholding district court’s exclusion of statements under Rule 807 after thorough review of the 
court’s findings), with FTC v. Figgie Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 608 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding an 
admission under Rule 807 as harmless error despite the fact that the district court made no findings 
of fact to support its judgment).  
 136.  Bonds, 608 F.3d at 501 (quoting United States v. Valdez-Soto, 31 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 
1994)).  The court also noted that its “sister circuits have also given district courts wide discretion in 
the application of FRE 807, whether it be to admit or exclude evidence.” Id.  
 137.  Id.  
 138.  See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d 545, 547–48 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(exceptional circumstances found because declarant had since been deported). 
 139.  See Bonds, 608 F.3d at 501.  The court also rejected the government’s near-miss argument: 
[W]here a statement “almost fit[s]” into other hearsay exceptions, the circumstance cuts 
in favor of admissibility under the residual exception.  We did not, however, hold the 
factor was determinative, only that it supported the district court’s application of FRE 
807 in that case to admit the evidence.  In this case, even though this was a “near miss” it 
was nevertheless a “miss” that may have permitted, but did not alone compel the trial 
court to admit Anderson’s statements under FRE 807. 
Id. (citations omitted).  The near-miss theory is discussed infra Part III.A.3. 
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804 excludes, with limited exceptions here not applicable.”
140
  Lastly, the 
court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the 
statements were untrustworthy based, in part, on the fact that the 
BALCO employee admitted he had intentionally mislabeled samples at 
Anderson’s request.
141
  The court concluded that, despite Anderson’s 
close relationship with Bonds, the employee’s admission rendered 
Anderson’s statements about the source of the samples untrustworthy.
142
 
These cases tend to demonstrate that courts generally take an all-
encompassing approach to determining whether a statement possesses 
“circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” that are equivalent to the 
hearsay exceptions in Rules 803 and 804.  In examining those 
circumstances, courts traditionally focus on the facts surrounding the 
making of the statement, relying on all of the available evidence while 
making fact-specific, i.e., not categorical, assessments of the statement’s 
trustworthiness.  In light of Wright,
143
 courts view corroborating 
evidence with suspicion, but allow it to be considered as a non-
determinative factor when evaluating the circumstances of 
trustworthiness.  While courts consider different factors when 
determining trustworthiness,
144
 the basic requirement is that 
circumstances surrounding the making of a hearsay statement are 
considered as part of a relatively unbounded inquiry.  However, not only 
must a trial court consider the guarantees of trustworthiness, but those 
guarantees must also be equivalent to the guarantees of trustworthiness 
inherent in the Rule 803 and 804 hearsay exceptions.  What makes those 
guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent for Rule 807 purposes is an 
entirely different debate—a debate surrounding what is commonly 
known in the courts and legal literature as the “near-miss” theory. 
3. Near Misses 
There is considerable disagreement among courts about whether it is 
                                                          
 140.  Id. at 501–02. 
 141.  Id. at 502. 
 142.  Id. (“To the extent the government contends that the district court improperly focused on 
Valente’s trustworthiness instead of on the trustworthiness of Anderson’s statements, the 
government misinterprets the district court’s opinion.”). 
 143.  See supra Part III.A.1 for a discussion of Wright and the Confrontation Clause limitations 
on the admission of hearsay against a criminal defendant.  
 144.  See supra text accompanying notes 72–75.  The Eleventh Circuit best summarized the 
myriad approaches taken by federal courts in ascertaining the trustworthiness of hearsay under the 
residual exception in Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 267 (2015). 
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appropriate to use the residual exception to admit a hearsay statement 
that approaches, but fails to fully satisfy, the requirements of an 
established hearsay exception—i.e., near-miss hearsay.  A majority of 
state and federal courts have accepted the notion that near-miss hearsay 
may be admitted.
145
  For example, the Michigan Supreme Court has 
stated that a “great majority of courts have” declined to exclude 
statements as near-miss hearsay “by interpreting the residual exception to 
omit as ‘specifically covered’ only those hearsay statements admissible 
under a categorical exception.  A statement not admissible under the 
categorical exceptions . . . thus could be a candidate for admissibility 
under the residual exceptions.”
146
  The propriety of the admission of 
near-miss hearsay turns on a truly odd and non-contextual interpretation 
of the introductory clause of Rule 807: “Under the following 
circumstances, a hearsay statement is not excluded by the rule against 
hearsay even if the statement is not specifically covered by a hearsay 
exception in Rule 803 or 804.”
147
  That is, the majority of courts that 
admit near-miss hearsay claim to do so on the ground that Rule 807 
permits the admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay because it is not 
covered by a categorical exception.  As was argued in Residual 
Exceptions, reliance on this narrow metric utterly flies in the face of the 
Rule’s explicit history and purpose—the relatively rare admission of 




For example, acceptance of the admission of near-miss evidence has 
permitted courts to admit bank business records that fail to qualify as 
records of regularly conducted activity despite their failure to meet the 
reliability requirements codified in Rule 803(6).  No one could plausibly 
argue that Congress did not contemplate the admissibility of bank 
records or that bank records which are missing any of the trustworthiness 
requirements found in Rule 803(6) possess “equivalent guarantees of 
trustworthiness” to records that fully satisfy Rule 803(6).  Indeed, courts 
that reject the admission of near-miss hearsay argue that “a statement 
that is ‘specifically covered’ by one of the enumerated exceptions in 
                                                          
 145.  See Bocchino & Sonenshein, supra note 71, at 74 (discussing the “liberal admissibility that 
most federal appellate courts provide to so-called ‘near-miss’ residual hearsay”).  
 146.  People v. Katt, 662 N.W.2d 12, 20 (Mich. 2003).  “[W]e decline to adopt the near-miss 
theory as part of our method for determining when hearsay statements may be admissible under 
MRE 803(24).” Id. at 21. 
 147.  FED. R. EVID. 807(a). 
 148.  See Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 885–88.  
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Rule 803 or 804 is ineligible even to be considered for admission 
pursuant to the residual exception.”
149
  These courts reason that the 
admission of out-of-court statements that do not satisfy the requirements 
for admission under an enumerated exception in Rule 803 or 804 is 
inconsistent with the original vision of the exception—a limited 
exception that should be reserved for “novel or unanticipated” categories 




Although some circuits had ruled that grand jury testimony was 
admissible against a criminal defendant
151
 prior to the seminal Supreme 
Court Confrontation Clause decision in Crawford v. Washington, it 
would seem that such cases have now been effectively overruled by 
Crawford because of the lack of cross examination.
152
  In United States v. 
Dent, the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court’s admission of specific 
grand jury testimony under the residual exception, holding that the 
testimony did not possess sufficient “circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness” to be admitted under the Rule.
153
  By reversing the 
district court’s fact-based trustworthiness determination, the court 
avoided the broader legal question of whether the residual exception ever 
applies to grand jury testimony.
154
  Judge Easterbrook issued a 
concurring opinion in which he explained the near-miss admissibility 
rationale.  He argued that the residual exception: 
reads more naturally if we understand the introductory clause to mean 
that evidence of a kind specifically addressed (“covered”) by one of the 
four other subsections must satisfy the conditions laid down for its 
admission, and that other kinds of evidence not covered (because the 
                                                          
 149.  DeCoux, supra note 66, at 102. 
 150.  See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 490 N.W.2d 753, 760 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (“[The residual 
hearsay exception] is for the novel or unanticipated category of hearsay that does not fall under one 
of the named categories, but which is as reliable as one of those categories.”). 
 151.  Compare United States v. Earles, 113 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that grand 
jury testimony is admissible under the residual exception even without the opportunity for 
confrontation), with United States v. Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(“Admission of Valdez’s grand jury testimony therefore violates the Confrontation Clause and is 
improper under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) because Valdez was not subject to cross-examination.”).  
 152.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004) (holding that “testimonial” out-of-
court statements offered against a criminal defendant are inadmissible unless the declarant is 
unavailable and the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant). 
 153.  United States v. Dent, 984 F.2d 1453, 1463 (7th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 154.  Id. at 1465 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (observing that the majority’s opinion “enables the 
court to avoid the question whether [the residual exception] applies to grand jury testimony in the 
first place”).  
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drafters could not be exhaustive) are admissible if the evidence is 




The following cases—all of which endorse admission of near-miss 
hearsay—represent the majority view of state and federal courts.  In 
United States v. Clarke, a case concerning the admissibility of prior 
testimony under the residual exception, the Fourth Circuit admitted near-
miss hearsay.
156
  In Clarke, the out-of-court statement was held 
inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(1).
157
  The facts of Clarke, as with many 
residual exception cases, are quite dramatic.  Clarke involved Jane 
Latimer who, after consenting to a search, was arrested with over five 
hundred grams of crack cocaine in a toolbox that was hidden in the 
wheel-well of a rental car.
158
  Latimer cooperated with authorities, who 
allowed her to conduct a staged delivery of the drugs to Michael Clarke 
at a North Carolina motel.
159
  Michael Clarke was arrested and 
subsequently indicted for possession with intent to distribute.
160
  He 
moved to suppress the drugs.
161
  At the suppression hearing Michael 
testified that his brother, Christopher Clarke, had purchased the 
cocaine.
162
  Christopher was then indicted and tried for conspiracy.
163
  At 
trial, Michael Clarke refused to testify against his brother.
164
 
The district court held that by refusing to testify, Michael was legally 
“unavailable.”
165
  Despite the clear inadmissibility of the testimony under 
the prior-testimony exception to the hearsay rule,
166
 the lower court held 
that, under the residual exception, Michael’s testimony from the 
suppression hearing was admissible at his brother’s trial.
167
  Christopher 
                                                          
 155.  Id. at 1465–66; see also People v. Katt, 662 N.W.2d 12, 18–19 (Mich. 2003) (quoting the 
Dent concurrence and discussing the near-miss debate).  
 156.  United States v. Clarke, 2 F.3d 81, 84–85 (4th Cir. 1993).  
 157.  Id. at 83. 
 158.  Id. at 82–83.  
 159.  Id. at 83. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id.  
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id.  
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).  The district court held, and the Fourth Circuit ultimately 
agreed, that Michael’s statements were not admissible under the former-testimony exception because 
they were not offered against a party who “had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the 
testimony by direct, cross or redirect examination.” Clarke, 2 F.3d at 83. 
 167.  Clarke, 2 F.3d at 83. 
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Christopher Clarke argued that the “not specifically covered” 
language of the residual exception limits the exception “to cases in no 
way touched by” the exceptions to the hearsay rule that are specifically 
enumerated in the rules.
169
  Clarke contended that it “would undermine 
the protections of the evidentiary rules, as well as violate the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause” for the Fourth Circuit to adopt the 
broad reading of the residual exception raised by the government.
170
  The 
Fourth Circuit rejected Clarke’s argument, holding that such a narrow 
construction of the residual exception would render it “a nullity.”
171
  The 
court held that the “specifically covered” language means that “if a 
statement does not meet all of the requirements for admissibility under 
one of the prior exceptions, then it is not ‘specifically covered’” and 
therefore can be admitted pursuant to the residual exception.
172
 
The court reasoned that endorsing the near-miss admissibility 
interpretation of the residual exception furthers the underlying purpose of 
the exception—that is, the exception is designed to allow the 
introduction of reliable evidence that fails to satisfy the requirements of 
an established exception.
173
  This, of course, is an excessively broad 
reading of the purpose of the exception in light of its legislative 
history.
174
  Echoing the Supreme Court’s hesitancy to apply the 
exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment expansively, the court 
harped on the fact that a narrow reading of the residual exception “would 
deprive the jury of probative evidence relevant to the jury’s truth-seeking 
role,”
175
 despite the fact that such evidence was never subjected to cross-
examination.  The court cited many cases allowing the admission of 
grand jury testimony under the residual exception as additional support 
for its ruling.
176
  The court expressed concern that an interpretation of the 
exception that renders evidence that is a “near miss” under a specific 
exception inadmissible under the residual exception “promises much 
                                                          
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. (citing United States v. Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir. 1989)). 
 173.  Id. at 84. 
 174.  See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the origins of the residual exception. 
 175.  Clarke, 2 F.3d at 83.  The Clarke court also argued that, “[t]he plain meaning, and the 
purpose, of [the residual exception] do not permit such a narrow reading.”  Id. 
 176.  Id. at 83–84. 
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litigation over how close a statement can come to one of the specified 
exceptions before it is rendered inadmissible.”
177
  Countless motions over 
that esoteric question, according to the Clarke court, “would create an 
odd situation where testimony that was equally trustworthy would be 
distinguishable based merely on its proximity to a specified 
exception.”
178
  The court thus adopted a broad reading of the residual 
exception, reluctant to set a bright-line rule limiting the scope of the 
exception to admit evidence that is almost, but not quite, admissible 
under Rule 803 or 804. 
Having rejected the argument that near-miss hearsay should never be 
admitted pursuant to the residual exception, the Fourth Circuit examined 
the “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” of the 
proffered hearsay.
179
  The court admitted that the suppression hearing 
testimony did not bear “identical” guarantees of trustworthiness required 
under nearly missed Rule 804(b)(1), yet the court nonetheless concluded 
that “they are in their totality equivalent.”
180
  The court pointed to a 
variety of facts surrounding the making of Michael Clarke’s suppression-
hearing testimony that indicated its trustworthiness, including: (1) he was 
questioned by his own attorney at the hearing; (2) his testimony was 
given under oath; and (3) he knew that his testimony could not be used 
against him at trial, decreasing his incentive to lie to avoid conviction.
181
  
Accordingly, the court held that Michael Clarke’s suppression-hearing 
testimony incriminating his brother could be introduced under the 




In United States v. Laster, the Sixth Circuit debated the merits of 
whether the proper reading of the residual exception permits the 
introduction of near-miss evidence.
183
  The case involved an appeal by 
James Laster, who argued that his drug conviction should be overturned 
                                                          
 177.  Id. at 84.  The court also worried that the inevitable “litigiousness [would be] contrary to 
the inquiry established by the residual exception, which focuses on whether the statement has 
‘equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.’”  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id.  
 181.  Id. at 84–85. 
 182.  Id. at 85.  Specifically, the court found that Christopher had “identified no reason for his 
brother to have falsely implicated him at the suppression hearing, and we can discern none.  Under 
these circumstances, the district court did not err in admitting a statement that had the ring of 
reliability about it.”  Id. 
 183.  United States v. Laster, 258 F.3d 525, 529–30 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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because it was based on hearsay (purchase orders and other records
184
 
involving the purchase of hydriodic acid and various other chemicals 
used to make methamphetamine) that was improperly admitted under the 
residual exception by the district court.
185
  He had attempted to purchase 
the chemicals in bulk, without authorization, using the company account 
of his employer, Universal Testing Inc.
186
  On appeal, he argued that the 
records were improperly admitted “under the business records exception” 
by the district court.
187
  After examining the facts of the case, the Sixth 
Circuit panel agreed with Laster that the hearsay evidence failed to meet 
the requirements for Rule 803(6), but split on the admissibility of the 
near-miss hearsay pursuant to Rule 807.
188
 
Despite the near miss on the business records exception, the court 
concluded that the purchase orders and related documents were 
admissible under the residual exception.
189
  The appellate-court majority 
read the “not specifically covered language” broadly while 
acknowledging the competing viewpoint on near-miss evidence: 
“Although some courts have held that if proffered evidence fails to meet 
the requirements of the Fed. R. Evid. 803 hearsay exception, it cannot 
qualify for admission under the residual exception, the court declines to 
adopt this narrow interpretation . . . .”
190
 The court held that the not-
specifically-covered language simply “‘means only that if a statement is 
admissible under one of the [hearsay] exceptions, [that exception] should 
be relied upon’ instead of the residual exception.”
191
 
Dissenting, Judge Karen Nelson Moore rejected this expansive 
reading of the residual exception, trenchantly rejecting the panel 
majority’s interpretation of Rule 807 and defending the generic exclusion 
                                                          
 184.  The complained-of records included: 
four invoices dated March 24, 1993, April 14, 1993, April 30, 1993, and May 14, 1993[,] 
which respectively reflected the sale on each date of one 500 milliliter bottle of hydriodic 
acid . . . .  An additional order for six 500 milliliter bottles had been sought by Laster, but 
was canceled by the supplier to Wilson Oil Company.  Also included in these records was 
the chemical diversion letter signed by Laster which referenced the sale of hydriodic acid 
to UTI by Wilson Oil Company. 
Id. at 529. 
 185.  Id. at 527.  
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. at 529; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
 188.  Laster, 258 F.3d at 529–30 (majority opinion), 532–35 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 189.  Id. at 530. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. (quoting United States v. Earles, 113 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 1997)). 




  Judge Moore argued that by rejecting the near-
miss theory the majority allowed the residual exception to swallow both 
the rule and all of the other exceptions.
193
  Judge Moore rejected the idea 
that the words “not specifically covered” meant that Rule 807 applies to 
statements that are declared inadmissible under Rule 803 or 804.
194
  
While acknowledging that her view was the minority view, Judge Moore 
argued that “[n]ot only is this minority approach consistent with the plain 
language of the rule, but it is also consistent with the legislative history 
of the residual exception, and the original Advisory Committee Note to 
Rule 807’s predecessors.”
195
  Judge Moore quipped that if her minority 
interpretation is the “near miss” theory of the residual exception, then the 
majority view should be considered the “close-enough” theory.
196
 
Judge Moore further argued that the majority’s close-enough 
approach rendered it irrelevant that the government failed to lay a proper 
foundation for the admission of the business records because the theory 
makes it unnecessary to produce a sponsoring witness at trial.
197
  It seems 
apparent, Judge Moore observed, that business records that lack a 
sponsoring witness, which was the case in Laster, generally lack 
“circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” under Rule 807.
198
  Judge 
Moore urged that the Sixth Circuit should not join the other circuits in 
expanding the residual hearsay exception to cover hearsay situations that 
were “clearly anticipated by the drafters of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.”
199
  In concluding, she chastised the majority for adopting 
such a “badly flawed” approach to Rule 807 without even discussing the 
structure of the rules, the legislative history of the residual exception, or 
the purpose of the specific hearsay exception at issue (the business 
records exception).
200
  Despite Judge Moore’s persuasive and passionate 
                                                          
 192.  See id. at 534 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“This plain-language interpretation of the residual 
exception is sometimes described by its detractors as the ‘near-miss theory’ of the residual 
exception . . . .” (citing United States v. Clarke, 2 F.3d 81, 84 (4th Cir. 1993))); see also Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1263 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (“The [near-
miss theory] is also supported by a basic principle of statutory construction, which we find equally 
applicable to the Federal Rules of Evidence: that the specific controls the general.”). 
 193.  Laster, 258 F.3d at 535 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 194.  Id. at 532–33.  
 195.  Id. at 533 (citations omitted). 
 196.  Id. at 534. 
 197.  Id. (“The majority’s holding thus appears to make it unnecessary ever to call a sponsoring 
witness to establish the admissibility of business records . . . .”).  
 198.  Id. at 535. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. at 534. 
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dissent, one firmly grounded in both the purpose and the plain language 
of Rule 807, the Sixth Circuit joined a majority of federal circuit courts 
by rejecting the near-miss theory in favor of a broad reading of the 
residual exception. 
A majority of state courts have also chosen to admit near-miss 
hearsay.  For example, in People v. Katt, the Supreme Court of Michigan 
held that the state residual exception
201
 allows for the admission of 
hearsay statements that narrowly miss one of the categorical exceptions 
of the state’s residual exception.
202
  Katt involved a defendant, Terry 
Lynn Katt, charged with sexually assaulting a boy and girl under the age 
of ten while he was living with their mother.
203
  One of the children was 
interviewed by a social worker, Angela Bowman, who testified during a 
preliminary hearing.
204
  Bowman testified that the seven-year-old boy 
detailed Katt’s abusive behavior to her, and Bowman related the graphic 
details of the defendant’s abuse to the jury.
205
  The defendant argued, and 
all of the Michigan courts agreed, that the statement was inadmissible 
under Michigan’s “tender-years” exception to the hearsay rule
206
 because 
                                                          
 201.  See MICH. R. EVID. 803(24) (“A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing 
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court 
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, (B) the statement is more 
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts, and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice 
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.  However, a statement may not be 
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse 
party, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the particulars 
of it, including the name and address of the declarant.”); see also People v. Katt, 662 N.W.2d 12, 17 
(Mich. 2003) (“MRE 803(24) is nearly identical to FRE 807.”). 
 202.  Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 21; see also Ann K. Triplett, Comment, A Sympathetic Vehicle: 
Michigan v. Katt and Setting Dangerous Precedent, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2004). 
 203.  Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 14–15. 
 204.  Id. at 15. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  The Michigan rule at issue in Katt, categorically titled “Child’s Statement About Sexual 
Act,” reads as follows: 
A statement describing an incident that included a sexual act performed with or on the 
declarant by the defendant or an accomplice is admissible to the extent that it 
corroborates testimony given by the declarant during the same proceeding, provided:  
(1) the declarant was under the age of ten when the statement was made;  
(2) the statement is shown to have been spontaneous and without indication of 
manufacture;  
(3) either the declarant made the statement immediately after the incident or any delay is 
excusable as having been caused by fear or other equally effective circumstance; and  
(4) the statement is introduced through the testimony of someone other than the declarant.   
If the declarant made more than one corroborative statement about the incident, only the 
first is admissible under this rule.  
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it was not the first corroborative statement made regarding the 
incident.
207
  Accordingly, Katt contended that because the tender-years 
hearsay exception “covers the field” of Bowman’s testimony—in that it 
involved hearsay from a minor of tender years—then the testimony must 
be inadmissible under the state’s residual exception.
208
 
Despite the prosecution’s concession that the out-of-court statements 
were inadmissible under the tender-years exception, the trial court held 
that Bowman’s testimony was nonetheless admissible under the residual 
exception.
209
  The court’s holding was based on “several indicia of 
trustworthiness” in the child’s statements to Bowman.
210
  The state 
intermediate appellate court upheld the trial court, rejecting the 
defendant’s proposal for the state to adopt the position that near-miss 
evidence is per se inadmissible.
211
  The Michigan Supreme Court was 
then called on to decide whether to adopt the expansive reading of the 
residual exception, in which a hearsay statement that is close to, but 




The Michigan Supreme Court began by observing that, were it to 
adopt the theory supporting the rejection of near-miss hearsay (the near-
miss theory), “a party could never use a residual exception to admit 
evidence that was inadmissible under, but related to, a categorical 
exception.”
213
  In affirming the Michigan Court of Appeals, and joining 
the federal appellate courts in Laster and Clarke, the Katt court rejected 
the generic exclusion of near-miss hearsay, stating: 
The great majority of courts have rejected the near-miss [exclusion] 
theory by interpreting the residual exception to omit as “specifically 
covered” only those hearsay statements admissible under a categorical 
exception.  A statement not admissible under the categorical exceptions 
                                                          
MICH. R. EVID. 803A.   
 207.  Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 15, 27. 
 208.  Id. at 15. 
 209.  Id. at 15–16.  
 210.  Id.  In so holding, the trial court stated:  
The Court finds no plan of falsification by [the child] under the circumstances in the 
record that I have before me, and no—and I do find a lack of motive to fabricate on the 
child’s part.  The Court also notes that Miss Bowman testified, and I believe her 
testimony, she had no preconceived notion that anything of a sexual nature occurred 
when she walked into the room . . . . 
Id. at 16. 
 211.  Id. at 16–17. 
 212.  Id. at 14. 
 213.  Id. at 19. 
748 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
would not be “specifically covered” by those exceptions, and thus 
could be a candidate for admissibility under the residual exceptions.
214
 
The Katt court’s interpretation of the residual exception focused on 
the word “specifically.”
215
  The court observed that since the word 
modifies “covered,” a “specifically covered” statement must be one that 
is “conformable to all the requirements of that categorical exception.”
216
  
The court also argued that, “[i]f the rule applied to all evidence not 
‘covered’ by other exceptions,” the argument for the exclusion of near-
miss hearsay would be more persuasive.
217
  However, observed the court, 
“the rule modifies the term ‘covered’ with the adjective ‘specifically.’  
Hence, more than simple ‘coverage’ is required.”
218
  Accordingly, the 
court held that a hearsay statement is “specifically covered” under the 
residual exception only when it is admissible under another specified 
exception to the hearsay rule.
219
  To put it another way, the Katt court 
ruled that hearsay qualifies for admission under the residual exception 
because it fails to meet the requirements for admissible hearsay as 
prescribed by the legislature for statements of its type. 
In so holding, the court stressed that rejection of the near-miss theory 
is not inconsistent with the purpose of the hearsay rules.
220
  The court 
reasoned that the requirement that a statement possess equivalent 
guarantees of trustworthiness to be admitted under the residual exception 
safeguards against a subversion of the hearsay rule.
221
  Under the Katt 
approach, “if a near-miss statement is deficient in one or more 
requirements of a categorical exception, those deficiencies must be made 
up by alternate indicia of trustworthiness.”
222
  Assuming the existence of 
such indicia, under the Michigan Rules of Evidence, the residual 
                                                          
 214.  Id. at 20.  
 215.  Id. at 21–22. 
 216.  Id. at 22 (emphasis omitted).  
 217.  Id. at 21. 
 218.  Id. at 21–22. 
 219.  Id. at 22. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. at 22–23. 
 222.  Id. at 23.  The Michigan Supreme Court further clarified its holding stating,  
[t]here is no complete list of factors that establish whether a statement has equivalent 
guarantees of trustworthiness.  However, the Confrontation Clause forbids the use of 
corroborative evidence to determine the trustworthiness of statements offered under the 
residual exception in criminal cases if the declarant does not testify at trial.  Beyond this 
limitation, courts should consider all factors that add to or detract from the statement’s 
reliability.  
Id. at 23–24 (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted).  
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exception can be used to admit statements that are “similar to, but not 
admissible under, the categorical hearsay exceptions.”
223
  The court went 
on to apply each element of the rule to the statement at issue, and 
affirmed the state appellate court’s ruling that the statement was 
admissible under the residual exception.
224
 
The Katt opinion sparked another passionate dissent, this time from 
now Chief Justice Robert P. Young Jr.  While acknowledging that his 
support for the near-miss exclusion theory garnered support in only a 
minority of jurisdictions, Justice Young argued that adopting the theory 
“best comports with the text of the residual hearsay exception as well as 
our time-honored prohibition against the admission of hearsay 
evidence.”
225
  According to Justice Young, endorsement of the majority’s 
broad reading of the prohibition against hearsay evidence allows for the 
admission of evidence explicitly held inadmissible under a specific 
exception to get a second bite at the apple under the all-encompassing 
residual exception.
226
  Furthermore, Justice Young looked at the 
exception’s drafting history and observed that the intention of the 
drafters of the residual exception was for it to apply only in “new and 
presently unanticipated situations.”
227
  Justice Young observed that the 
majority’s approach, which allows for the amorphous “interests of 
justice” to outweigh the general rule, combined with the extremely 
deferential standard of review afforded evidentiary determinations, 
renders the traditional proscription against the use of hearsay evidence 
“hollow and meaningless.”
228
  The dissent concluded that the majority’s 
holding in Katt would render the efforts to draw clear lines through the 
established hearsay exceptions “purposeless,” and instead advocated for 
an approach that “precludes admissibility [under the residual exception] 
where the evidence does not meet the specific textual requirements of an 
enumerated hearsay exception.”
229
  Nonetheless, in Katt, Michigan 
                                                          
 223.  Id. at 23. 
 224.  Id. at 26. 
 225.  Id. (Young, J., dissenting).  
 226.  Id. at 27. 
 227.  Id. at 28 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(24) advisory committee’s note) (emphasis omitted). 
 228.  Id. at 27–28 (“Against the nearly four-hundred-year-old historical development of our 
hearsay rules, it is clear that the drafters of the rules did not intend a wholesale trampling of the 
enumerated hearsay exceptions when the federal residual hearsay exceptions were enacted.”).  
 229.  Id. at 28–29; see also id. at 29 (“While the alternative construction proffered by my 
colleagues in the majority is a principled one, I believe my construction best harmonizes with the 
actual text of the evidentiary rule as well as our general and historical prohibition against the 
admission of hearsay evidence.  The clear language of the residual hearsay exception precludes 
admissibility where the evidence does not meet the specific textual requirements of an enumerated 
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joined a majority of courts in rejecting the near-miss theory of the 
residual exception. 
Clarke, Laster, and Katt illustrate the prevailing approach to near-
miss hearsay as adopted by state and federal courts.  Each court rejects 
the near-miss interpretation of the residual exception in favor of the 
broader close-enough approach to the admissibility of residual hearsay.  
Interestingly, the holdings in all three cases are themselves near misses, 
in that the courts were divided.  As made clear by Judge Moore’s and 
Justice Young’s passionate dissents, it is still up for debate as to whether 
this majority approach can in fact be squared with the history, purpose, 
and plain language of the residual exception to the hearsay rule.  By 
interpreting the residual exception in such a manner, these courts have 
exacerbated the current trend of affording judges almost unlimited 
discretion in admitting hearsay pursuant to the residual exception.  This 
approach is inconsistent with the express intentions of the Rule’s drafters 
as evidenced by the Committee notes, which state the Committee’s intent 
to limit the use of the residual exception to situations where it will 
“provide for treating new and presently unanticipated situations.”
230
  By 
admitting such evidence, it seems that the Rule 807 catch-all exception 
truly has swallowed all of the other exceptions, and along with it, the 
traditional ban on the use of hearsay testimony at both civil and criminal 
trials. 
So, given the reality that most courts have chosen to ignore the 
Rule’s clear legislative history and intent and admit near-miss hearsay, 
what can conscientious courts do to maintain the Rule-mandated 
obligation to admit only hearsay which bears equivalent guarantees of 
trustworthiness to that found in the categorical exceptions?  The answer 
lies in an approach suggested in Residual Exceptions more than thirty 
years ago, an approach that has been adopted by a number of courts.
231
  
That approach provides that where a court is forbidden by precedent 
from per se excluding near-miss hearsay, the court may admit near-miss 
evidence only where some circumstance in the making of the proffered 
                                                          
hearsay exception.”).  
 230.  FED. R. EVID. 803(24) advisory committee’s note (repealed 1997), REVISED DRAFT RULES 
OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 132 (1971), reprinted in 2 BAILEY & 
TRELLES, supra note 2; see also United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1452 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(“Courts must use caution when admitting evidence under Rule 803(24), for an expansive 
interpretation of the residual exception would threaten to swallow the entirety of the hearsay rule.”). 
 231. See, e.g., Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 23 (holding that, “if a near-miss statement is deficient in one 
or more requirements of a categorical exception, those deficiencies must be made up by alternate 
indicia of trustworthiness.”). 
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out-of-court statement makes up for the missing element(s) of the 




B. Probativeness: Probative Value and Reasonable Efforts to Procure 
Evidence 
Rule 807 requires that for evidence to be introduced under the 
residual exception it must be “more probative on the point for which it is 
offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through 
reasonable efforts.”
233
  Not long after the rule was originally enacted, 
Residual Exceptions argued that this requirement reads most naturally to 
require that evidence must be excluded under the residual exception 
“when other admissible evidence which is at least equally probative” is 
available.
234
  Most courts read Rule 807(a)(3) to have two functions: (1) 
it mandates that the hearsay be “more probative” than other evidence on 
point, and (2) it imposes an obligation on a proponent of the hearsay to 
endeavor to obtain other evidence that is equally probative before 
resorting to the residual exception.
235
  This requirement—which traces its 
origins to the necessity requirement announced in Dallas County—“was 
designed to limit admission to hearsay of ‘high probative value and 
necessity.’”
236
  Shortly after the inception of the Rule, numerous courts 
chose to find residual hearsay most probative where it “might be useful 
in helping the jury resolve conflicting evidence.”
237
  As Residual 
                                                          
 232. Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 888.  
 233.  FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(3); see also Bocchino & Sonenshein, supra note 71, at 77 
(“[E]vidence admitted pursuant to Rule 807 has the advantage of considering and valuing the 
trustworthiness of the statement, the necessity for a fair determination of the case and the interests of 
justice in determining its admissibility . . . .”). 
 234.  Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 889.  In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co., then district judge Edward Becker (later Chief Judge of the Third Circuit) read the 
probativeness requirement narrowly: “[I]t would be a travesty if the plaintiffs were permitted to 
invoke the residual exceptions when by a calculated litigation strategy they refused to even seek the 
necessary foundation required by the traditional hearsay exceptions.” 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1276 (E.D. 
Pa. 1980), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 
238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 
(1986). 
 235.  See Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 888. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. at 890; see also Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 294–95 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(admitting hearsay where declarant was the only one who knew what happened at the time); United 
States v. Toney, 599 F.2d 787, 790 (6th Cir. 1979) (admitting hearsay in light of conflicting 
evidence); United States v. Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554, 559–60 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (admitting 
witnesses’ hearsay testimony about a conversation of the defendant’s because their testimony was 
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Exceptions noted, this “tie-breaking” approach that had been adopted by 
various circuits was inconsistent with the purposes of the exception, 
unless the court actually determines that the tie-breaker is itself more 
probative than the conflicting evidence.
238
 
It is difficult to generalize a common approach to probativeness 
utilized by courts because each probativeness analysis varies greatly 
depending on the details and characteristics of the out-of-court statement 
being offered, the specific “point” for which the hearsay is being offered 
to prove, other evidence available to the offering party, and, of course, 
the facts and circumstances attendant to trial.  Courts have announced 
rules relating to the residual exception that appear to read aspects of the 
probativeness requirement more broadly than the plain language of Rule 
807 suggests.  The requirement that an out-of-court statement be “more 
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence” 
does not mean that the evidence must be essential; rather, in some 
jurisdictions it means that the statement must be merely helpful to the 
fact-finder and not completely superfluous.
239
  Under this view, evidence 
can be more probative in situations where other probative evidence was 
already available at trial to prove the same point as the hearsay admitted 
under the residual exception.  On the other hand, some courts have held 
that the plain language of the residual exception “essentially creates a 
‘best evidence’ requirement.”
240
  This is the more restrictive view of the 
                                                          
the only testimony that could help clear up a direct conflict between the government’s chief witness 
and the defendant’s testimony), aff’d, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 238.  Residual Exceptions argued that: 
[T]he “tie-breaking” view of probativeness is inconsistent with the view of both the 
Advisory Committee and Congress that the residual exceptions shall be applied sparingly 
and only in extraordinary situations.  After all, virtually all cases which go to trial turn on 
conflicting versions of the facts.  It could nearly always be said that the jury would be 
helped by the admission of additional evidence.  Therefore, if the probativeness 
requirement for the proffered hearsay is met whenever a clear conflict in the evidence 
exists, the residual exceptions could be applied routinely and in rather ordinary situations.  
Indeed, the probativeness requirement would be a virtual dead letter. 
Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 893. 
 239.  See United States v. Howard, 774 F.2d 838, 846 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he Rule ‘does not 
require that hearsay evidence be essential in order that it be admissible,’ but instead ‘[i]t is enough 
that it is the most probative evidence reasonably available on a material issue in the case.’” (quoting 
United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 589 (7th Cir. 1982))).  
 240.  See Larez v. City of L.A., 946 F.2d 630, 644 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The statements’ admission, 
therefore, was erroneous because the newspaper quotations were not the best available evidence of 
what Gates said; testimony from the reporters themselves would have been better.  The Larezes 
knew as much for they had the reporters subpoenaed and apparently ready to testify.  We cannot 
fault defense counsel for he specifically requested an opportunity to cross-examine the reporters 
before the evidence was admitted.”). 
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probativeness requirement.  The following cases are representative of the 
varying interpretations of Rule 807 in the federal courts.  Of particular 
note, and largely unaddressed by residual-exception scholarship, these 
courts suggest that litigants can strategically prevent an adversary from 
introducing evidence under the residual exception by utilizing judicial 
precedent interpreting the meaning of more probative or by pointing out 
the lack of effort by the proponent to develop more probative, admissible 
evidence. 
1. The Basics: United States v. Howard 
In 1985, the Seventh Circuit addressed the meaning of the 
probativeness requirement in United States v. Howard.
241
  In 1982, 
Edward Howard and Thomas Cusack, Democratic precinct captains in 
the city of Chicago, were indicted in a thirty-three-count indictment with 
charges ranging from voter fraud to mail fraud.
242
  Howard and Cusack, 
along with other local politicians and a local judge, had concocted a 
conspiracy to rig the ballot for the forty-fourth precinct of Chicago.
243
  
The scheme involved the voter registration process and the voting 
process: 
Several persons, including the defendant Cusack, falsely registered to 
vote by claiming to reside at addresses within the precinct when they 
actually resided elsewhere.  The actual residents at these addresses 
were asked to place name-tags on their doors that bore the names of the 
non-resident registrants.  The defendants, and several others acting 
under their direction, also participated in a canvass of the precinct 
during September and October 1982.  Although the canvass disclosed 
that a number of persons who were registered to vote in the precinct 
had died, moved away, or for some other reason had become ineligible 
to vote, these persons were not struck from the list of eligible voters.  
                                                          
 241.  Howard, 774 F.2d at 845–46. 
 242.  Id. at 840.  The charged offenses included:  
[1] conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 371 (1982), voting more than once in 
an election held in part for the purpose of electing a member of the United States House 
of Representatives in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(e) (1982), [2] giving false 
information to establish eligibility to vote in such an election in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 
1973i(c) (1982), [3] committing mail fraud in connection with the mailing of absentee 
ballots in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), and [4] aiding and abetting others in the 
commission of these offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).  
Id. 
 243.  Id. (“In addition to the defendants, the participants in the conspiracy included Darryl 
Cunningham, a Democratic precinct worker, and Charlotte Watson, a Republican election judge, 
both of whom were named as unindicted co-conspirators in the indictment against the defendants.”). 
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Finally, on election day the defendants, either personally or by acting 




Both were convicted after a ten-day jury trial.
245
  The co-defendants 
challenged their convictions, alleging that certain hearsay statements 
made by William Espina were erroneously admitted at trial under the 
residual exception.
246
  Espina was the true resident at one of the 
addresses used by Howard to falsely register ineligible voters.
247
  Espina 
was unavailable to testify at trial, as he had died in the interim.
248
  Prior 
to his passing, Espina was interviewed by an investigator hired by 
Howard’s attorney.
249
  The transcript of that interview was read to the 
jury at trial over Howard’s objections.
250
  The testimony tended to 
confirm that Howard gave Espina a specific handwritten nametag to hang 
on his door, which allowed the jury to infer that Howard was pivotal in 
the conspiracy. 
The Seventh Circuit held that, in light of the substantial discretion 
vested in district courts to admit residual hearsay, the trial court did not 
err in admitting Espina’s out-of-court statement.
251
  After examining the 
trustworthiness and materiality of the statement, the court turned to 
probativeness.  Howard argued that the interview with Espina was not 
the most probative evidence available because the government could 
have obtained evidence “by examining the name-tag itself for Howard’s 
                                                          
 244.  Id. (“The evidence introduced at the defendants’ ten-day trial . . . revealed a carefully-
orchestrated scheme by the defendants to cast false ballots for the straight Democratic ticket in the 
November election.”). 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. at 845.  Howard was decided under Rule 804(5), before the two residual exceptions for 
unavailable and available declarants merged under Rule 807.  See id. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Id. 
 250.  Id.  More specifically: 
An F.B.I. agent testified at trial that when he interviewed Espina at his residence on 
February 9, 1983, he discovered a tag bearing the name “Sufranski” on Espina’s door.  
Espina volunteered to the agent that Howard had put the tag on his door.  The agent 
removed the tag at Espina’s request, and it was introduced at trial.  On June 1, 1983, an 
investigator for Howard’s trial counsel interviewed Espina at his residence, and had the 
interview transcribed by a court reporter.  The transcript of the interview, which was read 
to the jury, revealed Espina reaffirming that Howard had placed the Sufranski name-tag 
on his door.  
Id.  
 251.  Id. at 846.  




  The circuit court referred to this 
argument as mere speculation and concluded that Espina’s statements 




In so holding, the court affirmatively stated that “the Rule ‘does not 
require that hearsay evidence be essential in order that it be admissible,’ 
but instead ‘it is enough that it is the most probative evidence reasonably 
available on a material issue in the case.’”
254
  The court reasoned that 
Espina’s evidence was most probative due to his clear unavailability and 
the speculative nature of Howard’s claim that the government should 
have gone out and discovered “more probative evidence” that may or 
may not have existed.
255
  As such, it did not matter whether the 
government could have sought and obtained other evidence that would 
have allowed the jury to conclude that Howard placed the sign on the 
door; what mattered was that Espina’s statements were “the only 
available direct proof” that Howard placed the sign on the door.
256
  The 
court accordingly concluded that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the statements under the residual exception.
257
 
While the Seventh Circuit’s holding was both well reasoned and 
rational, other courts have placed more of a burden on the party seeking 
to introduce residual hearsay when proving it took reasonable efforts to 
locate other admissible evidence.  Howard begs the following question: 
When a party argues evidence is inadmissible under Rule 807 because 
other “more probative evidence could have been obtained through 
reasonable means,” what is “reasonable”?  This question lends itself to a 
case-by-case analysis.  It is worth remembering that in Dallas County, 
the Fifth Circuit found the newspaper account to be the most probative 
available evidence because of the likelihood that no eyewitnesses would 
be available some fifty years after the fire.
258
 
2. The Circumstantial-Direct Proof Dichotomy 
When it comes to the determination of the meaning of more 
                                                          
 252.  Id.   
 253.  Id.  
 254.  Id. (quoting United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 589 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 257.  Id. 
 258.  Dallas Cty. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 397 (5th Cir. 1961). 
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probative evidence for purposes of Rule 807, Howard appears to 
recognize a hierarchical distinction between direct and circumstantial 
evidence.  Six years before Howard, the Seventh Circuit decided Huff v. 
White Motor Corp.,
259
 one of the most widely cited residual-exception 
cases.
260
  In Huff, Helen Huff filed a wrongful death action against White 
Motor Corp. for the death of her husband, Jessee Huff, on the theory that 
the fuel tank of Huff’s truck-tractor was defectively designed.
261
  While 
driving his tractor on the highway, the cab of tractor caught fire, which 
led to severe, and ultimately fatal, burns.
262
  Two days after the accident, 
while in the hospital, Huff gave an account of what happened leading up 
to the fire and ensuing crash.
263
  The district court admitted the statement 
under the residual exception, and the jury returned a $700,000 verdict.
264
 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit required the admission of Huff’s 
statement under the residual exception.
265
  In addressing the 
probativeness requirement, the court concluded that Huff’s testimony 
was the most probative evidence available because the only other 
relevant evidence about the events leading up to the fire—particularly, 
whether the fire in the cab preceded the crash—was expert opinion and 
“circumstantial testimony” from another witness about “what he saw 
when he arrived at the scene after the crash.”
266
  Because “Huff was in 
the cab immediately before the crash and knew whether there was a fire 
in the cab at that time,” the court observed, “[u]nless the hearsay is 
admitted, there will be no direct evidence on that question.”
267
  
Accordingly, the court found that the direct hearsay evidence was 
undoubtedly more probative than the live, in-court testimony of other 




Other courts have followed suit in addressing the distinction between 
circumstantial and direct proof for probativeness purposes.  The Ninth 
Circuit, for example, has suggested that when an out-of-court statement 
                                                          
 259.  Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 260.  See Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 883–84, 890 (discussing Huff). 
 261.  Huff, 609 F.2d at 289. 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Id. at 290. 
 264.  Id. at 289. 
 265.  Id. at 295.  That is, unless the district court found that Huff was not competent at the time 
he made the statement. Id.  
 266.  Id. 
 267.  Id.  
 268.  Id.  
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provides direct proof of a disputed fact—as opposed to circumstantial 




In 2001, Reed Slatkin was convicted of operating a Ponzi scheme.
270
  
“Slatkin’s Ponzi scheme involved over $593 million and approximately 
800 investors, and resulted in losses exceeding $240 million.”
271
  He pled 
guilty and was subsequently sentenced to fourteen years in prison.
272
  In 
In re Slatkin, the trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Reed Slatkin initiated 
adversary proceedings for recovery and avoidance against numerous 
Slatkin investors who were paid out of the scheme.
273
  Reed’s plea 
agreement was admitted under the residual exception at the recovery 
proceedings.
274
  The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that “Slatkin’s 
admissions in the plea agreement that he operated a Ponzi scheme, and 
that he did so with the actual intent to defraud, are more probative on 
these issues than any other evidence the Trustee could procure.”
275
  The 
court reasoned that because “direct proof of fraudulent intent is rarely 
available,” the introduction of the plea agreement under the residual 
exception would obviate the need for the Trustee to prove the element 
with circumstantial evidence.
276
  Accordingly, the court upheld the 
admission under the residual exception, holding that the plea agreement 
was the most probative evidence available on the issue of fraudulent 
intent, regardless of any reasonable efforts the trustee could have taken to 
procure evidence tending to prove such intent.
277
 
This distinction between direct and circumstantial proof may leave 
litigants with a confounding strategic choice when faced with an 
adversary who is seeking to introduce certain harmful hearsay statements 
                                                          
 269.  See Santa Barbara Capital Mgmt. v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), 525 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“Slatkin’s admissions in the plea agreement that he operated a Ponzi scheme, and that he did 
so with the actual intent to defraud, are more probative on these issues than any other evidence the 
Trustee could procure.”). 
 270.  Id. at 809.  When discussing Slatkin’s actions, the court noted that under the scheme, 
Slatkin “paid investors purported profits primarily using funds raised from other investors.” Id.   
 271.  Id. 
 272.  Id. 
 273.  Id.  “[T]he Trustee sought to avoid as fraudulent any transfer made by Slatkin to an 
investor to the extent that such transfer exceeded the amount the investor had given Slatkin, i.e., the 
amount of the investor’s purported profit on their investment.” Id.  
 274.  Id. at 810–811; see also id. at 811–12 (affirming the bankruptcy court’s admission of the 
plea agreement, though noting that the court had not indicated which exception it was admitted 
under). 
 275.  Id. at 812. 
 276.  Id.  
 277.  Id.  
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under the residual exception.  In that situation, a party could theoretically 
stipulate to “the point for which [the hearsay] is offered,” rendering the 
hearsay less probative than the stipulation.
278
  This maneuver would keep 
evidence from the jury that might otherwise allow a jury to draw 
inferences from the evidence beyond the specific point for which it is 
offered.  This strategy may arise more frequently if courts adopt the First 
Circuit’s confusing approach in United States v. Sposito, in which the 
residual hearsay does not have to be offered to prove a material fact.
279
 
For instance, imagine that the government seeks to introduce a diary 
entry written by the victim under the residual exception at a murder trial, 
arguing that it is the most probative evidence available because the 
victim cannot testify.  The prosecution plans to have the victim’s diary 
entry read to the jury in a dramatic fashion.  Suppose further that the 
diary contained facts and circumstances surrounding the day of the 
murder and the defendant’s relationship with the victim, thus tending to 
suggest that they had a recent falling out.  The defense attorney is 
concerned that the dramatic reading of the diary will humanize the victim 
at the expense of the defendant; yet the attorney cannot call the defendant 
to testify.  In that scenario, it may well be in the best interests of the 
defendant to stipulate to the facts contained in the diary.  Such a strategy 
would effectively thwart the government’s ability to offer circumstantial 
(and more damning) evidence—that is, the diary—to prove the point 
under the residual exception.  This type of strategizing may be 
encouraged in light of the direct versus circumstantial dichotomy 
currently embraced by the Seventh Circuit in Howard and the Ninth 
Circuit in In re Slaktin. 
3. Reasonable Efforts to Procure More Probative Evidence and the 
Relevance of Witness Credibility 
In situations not involving direct evidence, courts have placed a 
burden on the proponent of residual hearsay to come forward with proof 
that it went through reasonable efforts to locate more probative evidence.  
While this Article has examined many cases in which the district court 
admitted evidence under the residual exception, there are numerous cases 
in which courts have found that a failure to prove due diligence can 
render the residual exception unavailable as a means of introducing 
                                                          
 278.  FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5)(B). 
 279.  United States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1047 (1st Cir. 1997).  See infra notes 303–23 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Sposito.  




  In United States v. Welsh, the government appealed from a 
district court order excluding certain hearsay statements for failing to 
satisfy the probativeness requirement of the residual exception.
281
  In 
Welsh, a grand jury issued three different indictments for crimes 
allegedly committed by six defendants—crimes including “transporting 
stolen motor oil and a semi-trailer,” “theft of the oil from interstate 




The government notified the defendants of its intention to introduce 
three written statements given to the FBI by Roger E. Massie as part of a 
plea bargain at trial.
283
  Massie was a truck driver involved in the 
interstate conspiracy, and the agreement detailed each defendant’s 
involvement in the conspiracy.
284
  Massie committed suicide shortly after 
he signed the plea agreement.
285
  The government sought to introduce the 
written statements at trial to establish the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the interstate conspiracy.
286
  At trial, however, James 
Casey—a government informant who was also a truck driver in the 
conspiracy—was available to testify to all of the facts contained in 
Massie’s statements.
287
  The government did not dispute that Casey 
would be available at trial to testify to the facts contained in Massie’s 
plea agreement.
288
  The district court accordingly held that the statements 
were inadmissible under the residual exception because they were not 
more probative than Casey’s potential testimony.
289
  The government 
appealed to the Fourth Circuit. 
                                                          
 280.  See, e.g., United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (“UTC 
could have taken reasonable steps to obtain admissible testimony directly from Mazer prior to the 
district court’s ruling on APM’s motion to dismiss, but it failed to do so.  As such, Rule 807 cannot 
salvage the admissibility of Mazer’s statements . . . .”); Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 
743 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that evidence was inadmissible under the residual exception because 
“plaintiffs could easily have obtained the reporter’s affidavit even if it was for some reason 
infeasible to depose him”); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 13 F. Supp. 2d 
1064, 1070 (D. Nev. 1998) (“[S]tatements quoted in newspaper articles fail to satisfy the best 
evidence requirement of subsection (B) because testimony from reporters or editors themselves 
regarding what Mayor Jones and Mr. Paris said or wrote would have been better evidence.”). 
 281.  United States v. Welsh, 774 F.2d 670, 673 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 282.  Id. at 671. 
 283.  Id. 
 284.  Id. 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  Id. at 671–72. 
 287.  Id. at 671. 
 288.  Id. at 671–72.  
 289.  Id. at 671. 
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On appeal, the government conceded that Casey’s potential 
testimony and Massie’s written statements would be offered to prove the 
same set of facts.
290
  The government nonetheless argued that, under the 
residual exception, Massie’s statements were more probative than 
Casey’s testimony because Casey lacked credibility before a jury.
291
  
Casey had a history of lying to federal officers and committing perjury, 
which the defense would surely use to impeach Casey on cross-
examination.
292
  The government introduced evidence that tended to 
show that Casey was not a trustworthy witness; he testified as a principal 
government witness at two separate criminal trials, and neither trial 
resulted in a guilty verdict.
293
  The court even acknowledged that “there 
[was] some support for the government’s argument that Casey [was] not 
a very credible witness.”
294
  Despite these arguments, and the availability 
of Massie’s unimpeachable statements to further the likelihood of 
conviction, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s refusal to admit 
the evidence under the residual exception.
295
 
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the government’s logic was flawed 
because credibility is not synonymous with probativeness.
296
  After 
defining both credibility and probativeness,
297
 the court announced a 
bright-line rule regarding the import of a potential witness’s credibility 
under Rule 807: “[T]he credibility of a witness has nothing to do with 
whether or not his testimony is probative with respect to the fact which it 
seeks to prove.”
298
  Despite the fact that Massie’s statement was clearly 
more credible than other evidence on the same point, the court held that 
                                                          
 290.  Id. at 671–72. 
 291.  Id. at 672 (“[T]he government argues that Massie’s statements are more probative than 
Casey’s testimony would be because Casey would not be a believable witness.”).  
 292.  Id. 
 293.  Id.  Interestingly, the government argued that “those acquittals resulted primarily because 
the juries would not convict on the basis of Casey’s testimony.”  Id. 
 294.  Id.   
 295.  Id. at 673 (“Casey’s proposed testimony is just as probative as Massie’s statement, 
although Casey may be a less credible man than was Massie.  We are thus of opinion the district 
court was correct in its holding . . . .”).  
 296.  Id. at 672 (“We think the government’s position is not sound for it confuses the terms 
probative and credible.”). 
 297.  Id.  The Fourth Circuit explained that:  
The probative value of evidence is its “tendency . . . to establish the proposition that it is 
offered to prove.”  Evidence has probative value if it tends to prove the issue in dispute.   
Credibility on the other hand goes to “the quality or power of inspiring belief.”  “A 
credible witness is one who, being competent to give evidence, is worthy of belief.”   
Id. (citations omitted). 
 298.  Id. 
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Massie’s written statements were not more probative on the facts 
surrounding the conspiracy than Casey’s testimony—as required for 
admission under the residual exception.
299
  Welsh thus stands for the 
proposition that credibility is not a component of either relevance or 
probativeness for residual exception purposes. 
The majority’s credibility-probativeness distinction elicited a short 
dissent from Judge Kenneth Keller Hall.  Judge Hall argued that Casey’s 
proposed testimony was in no way equally probative to Massie’s written 
statements.
300
  He argued that Casey’s testimony was “so unworthy of 
belief as to lack any probative value whatsoever.”
301
  The dissent would 
have reversed the district court for abuse of discretion in refusing to 
admit the evidence under the residual exception.
302
 
Welsh suggests, then, that if a party has only hearsay, or a less than 
credible witness available to testify to disputed facts, the witness’ 
testimony constitutes more probative evidence regardless of credibility. 
4. The Relationship Between Materiality and Probativeness 
The First Circuit had the opportunity to discuss the relationship 
between the materiality and probativeness requirements in 1997.  In 
United States v. Sposito, defendant Michael Sposito challenged the 
district court’s admission of Louis Padova’s testimony under the residual 
exception at his trial for illegal gambling.
303
  Padova had testified under a 
compulsion and immunity order at the trial of another man, Arthur 
Marder, who had been charged with illegal gambling.
304
  At Marder’s 
trial, Padova testified that Marder had paid off local politicians to protect 
his illegal gambling enterprise.
305
  According to Padova, Sposito was the 
middleman through whom these payments were made.
306
  Padova 
refused, however, to testify at Sposito’s trial and was held in contempt.
307
  
The government sought to admit Padova’s prior testimony from 
Marder’s trial in light of Padova’s unavailability, and the district court 
                                                          
 299.  Id. at 673. 
 300.  Id. (Hall, J., dissenting).   
 301.  Id.  
 302.  Id. 
 303.  United States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1043 (1st Cir. 1997).  
 304.  Id. at 1046.   
 305.  Id. 
 306.  Id.  
 307.  Id. 
762 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
admitted the testimony under the residual exception.
308
  In articulating 
the point that Padova’s testimony was offered to prove, the district court 
explained: “the testimony relates to a material fact whether Arthur 
Marder was indeed paying off politicians to obtain protection for his . . . 
business . . . .  If that fact is proven, it increases the likelihood that he 
was paying off those politicians through Mr. Sposito.”
309
  Sposito 
appealed the ruling that Padova’s testimony was the most probative 
evidence that the government could procure on that point.
310
 
The First Circuit took issue with the defendant’s assumption that the 
rule requires residual hearsay to be more probative as it relates to a 
material fact.
311
  Looking to the plain language of the rule to examine the 
relationship between the probativeness and materiality requirements, the 
court observed that, under the residual exception, the statement must 
only “be more probative ‘on the point for which it is offered’”; nothing 
in the language requires that point to be one of material fact.
312
  The 
court supported such a reading by considering the intent of the drafters of 
the residual exception.
313
  The drafters of the Federal Rules, the court 
noted, could have easily added the words “of material fact” after “on the 
point,” but refused to do so, opting for a broader conception of what 
constitutes more probative hearsay.
314
  The court thus held that the rule 
“does not require that the issue on which the statement is most probative 
be a material fact; it requires only that it be probative on the point ‘for 
which it is offered.’”
315
 
The court then undertook an in-depth exploration of the Dallas 
County decision—the inspiration for the residual exception.
316
  The court 
reasoned that under an alternative construction of the probativeness 
requirement, the newspaper article in Dallas County addressing the 
lightening strike on the Dallas County clock tower would not have been 
admissible.
317
  The court offered the following reasoning, which reads 
                                                          
 308.  Id. 
 309.  Id.  
 310.  Id.  
 311.  See id. (“To conclude, as defendant does, that the question of whether Marder was paying 
politicians is material fact and yet the fact that he stated as much to Padova is not a material fact is 
an exceedingly fine distinction, and not one upon which the question of admissibility should turn.”).  
 312.  Id. at 1046–47 (citing FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5)(B) (repealed 1997)). 
 313.  Id. at 1047. 
 314.  Id. 
 315.  Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5)(B) (repealed 1997)).  
 316.  Id. at 1047–48.  
 317.  Id.  
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like an LSAT logic game: 
The newspaper article was introduced as evidence of the material fact 
that the charred timbers were the result of a fire that took place more 
than fifty years prior to the case.  The newspaper story did not, 
however, go directly to the question of why the charred timbers were in 
the tower, it only went to the fact that there had been a fire in 1901.  
The story was not more probative on the point of why the timbers were 
charred than any other evidence.  It was, however, more probative than 
any other evidence that the insurers could provide on the question of 
whether there had been a fire.
318
 
The court reasoned that, because the drafters of the residual 
exception were inspired by Dallas County and the newspaper was not 
more probative as to a material fact, the drafters intended the 
probativeness inquiry to be separate and distinct.
319
 
While Sposito accurately states the influence Dallas County had on 
the creation of the residual exception, it does not account for the fact that 
in drafting the residual exception the drafters may have intended to 
impose more stringent requirements than those imposed by Judge 
Wisdom in deciding to admit the fifty year-old newspaper article in 
Dallas County.  As Residual Exceptions demonstrated through an in-
depth examination of the legislative history of the federal rules,
320
 the 
exception was intended to be more restrictive than the Dallas County 
approach.
321
  Yet, the First Circuit read the exception as a mere 
codification of Dallas County.
322
  This approach demonstrates that (as 
was the case in 1982 when Residual Exceptions was published) courts at 
times read the residual exception in an exceedingly broad manner, which 
furthers the trend of unbounded judicial discretion to admit residual 
hearsay. 
Furthermore, the First Circuit’s questionable interpretation of the 
residual exception greatly increases the likelihood that residual hearsay 
will be admissible.  Proponents of such hearsay can just narrowly define 
“the point for which it is offered” to evidence that goes to a seemingly 
                                                          
 318.  Id. 
 319.  Id.  
 320.  See Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, 871–75 (detailing numerous amendments to the 
residual exception).  For an overview of the history of the residual exception, see supra Part II.A. 
 321.  Id. at 871–76; see also id. at 875 (“Legislative history thus shows that Congress intended to 
balance the need for growth in the law of hearsay with the need for certainty and regularity in the 
standards for the admission of hearsay.  Congress sought to impose guidelines; it did not permit 
unbounded judicial discretion.”). 
 322.  Sposito, 106 F.3d at 1048. 
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similar point.  With that said, the court’s probativeness-materiality 
distinction may in fact be a distinction without a difference.  As noted by 
Professor Sonenshein, given the redundant nature of the materiality 
requirement, and the general requirement that all evidence be material 
under the rules, it is unclear what, if any, practical effect this attempt to 
keep probativeness and materiality distinct will have on the admissibility 
of evidence under Rule 807.
323
 
In sum, the propriety of the residual exception often turns on the 
probativeness requirement.  When examining probativeness, numerous 
factors are at play, thereby making the probativeness inquiry as fact-
bound as judicial attempts to discern trustworthiness.  Ultimately, 
however, when litigants are faced with an adversary seeking to admit 
residual hearsay, they would be well served to examine the precedent 
interpreting probativeness with an eye toward using case law 
strategically to render the hearsay inadmissible.  Such a strategy would 
examine the relationship between materiality and probativess, other 
efforts the adversary could have or should have taken to procure more 
probative evidence, and whether it is worth submitting evidence on the 
same point as circumstantial hearsay to render the hearsay less probative.  
Therefore, when considering the admissibility of residual hearsay that is 
potentially harmful to their case, litigants should examine the 
probativeness requirement closely. 
C. Pretrial Notice: Procedural Safeguard or Discarded Requirement? 
In addition to the four substantive requirements for admission under 
the residual exception, there is a procedural fairness requirement: the 
obligation to provide pretrial notice of the intention to offer residual 
hearsay.  As originally adopted in Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), the 
residual exception required notice to be provided “sufficiently in advance 
of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity 
to prepare to meet it.”
324
  The advisory committee subsequently 
combined the rules in Rule 807 and made stylistic changes.  Rule 807(b) 
now provides that hearsay is admissible “only if, before the trial or 
hearing, the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the 
intent to offer the statement and its particulars, including the declarant’s 
                                                          
 323.  See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.  
 324.  FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5) (repealed 1997), FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 18–19 
(1975), reprinted in 4 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 2.  
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name and address, so that the party has a fair opportunity to meet it.”
325
  
The committee made clear, however, that the amendments to the rules 
were not intended to change the well-established meaning of the residual 
exception.
326
  The new version includes more specifics, including the 
particularity requirement and that the declarant’s information be made 
available to an adverse party.
327
  Under both the old version of the rule 
and the new, the residual exception “seems to provide little flexibility 
regarding whether notice must be given in advance of trial.”
328
 
Despite that the rule appears to leave little room for judicial whimsy, 
since its inception, the requirement has not been read as strictly as the 
plain language suggests.
329
  In 1982, Residual Exceptions demonstrated 
that “[t]he United States Courts of Appeals are sharply divided between 
the two views respecting the matter of notice,” and have adopted two 
disparate approaches: the flexible view and the strict view.
330
  The article 
supported the flexible approach to pretrial notice under the residual 
exception as a matter of policy, arguing that “[t]he flexible view satisfies 
the purpose of the notice requirements, which is to provide adequate time 
for the opponent to prepare, placing the opponent in no worse position 
than he would have faced had pretrial notice been given.”
331
  At the same 
time, the author noted one not-so-small problem with the flexible 
approach—that is, the language of the rules “unequivocally require[s] 
pretrial notice.”
332
  He accordingly concluded his article by arguing, 
“Congress should amend the residual exception rules to conform to the 
flexible view of notice and rescue the courts that have adopted it from 
                                                          
 325.  FED. R. EVID. 807(b). 
 326.  The advisory committee made clear in 1997 when the rules were combined that “[n]o 
change in meaning [was] intended.”  FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s note to 1997 
amendments.  In 2011, when the rules were restyled, the committee again stated that “[t]here [was] 
no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.”  FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory 
committee’s note to 2011 amendments; see also Bohler-Uddeholm Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Grp., Inc., 
247 F.3d 79, 112 n.17 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Bailey addressed the old residual hearsay exceptions 
contained in Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), but because Rule 807 is simply the combination of these 
rules, Bailey’s holding applies to the current Rule 807 as well.  The same is true of other pre-1997 
cases on the residual hearsay exceptions that are cited in this Section.”). 
 327.  See FED. R. EVID. 807(b). 
 328.  Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 901. 
 329.  Compare United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1978) (adopting the flexible 
approach to pretrial notice), and United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1976) (similar 
flexible approach), with United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 358 (2d Cir. 1978) (adopting the 
strict approach to pretrial notice).  
 330. Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 904. 
 331.  Id.  
 332.  Id.   
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decisions which are unquestionably correct as a matter of policy, but 
erroneous as a matter of law.”
333
  More than thirty years and two 
amendments to the residual exception later, Congress has yet to take him 
up on that all-to-obvious suggestion that would harmonize the text of the 
rule with its underlying purpose and much judicial practice. 
The circuit courts are also split on the situations in which hearsay 
can be admitted under the residual exception in the absence of timely 
pretrial notice.  In United States v. Panzardi-Lesperi, the First Circuit 
explained the conflict between the intent of the residual exception and 
the seemingly clear textual requirement that a proponent provide pretrial 
notice.
334
  There, Santiago Panzardi-Lespier appealed his conviction and 
nineteen-year sentence for his involvement in a drug conspiracy.
335
  
Specifically, he challenged the admissibility of grand jury testimony of a 
confidential informant who was murdered before trial, which was 
introduced at trial pursuant to the residual exception.
336
  The prosecution 
did not notify Panzardi-Lespier of its intent to introduce the grand jury 
testimony under the residual exception until the third day of trial.
337
 
On appeal, Panzardi-Lespier argued that the notice he received was 
inadequate and untimely, and he urged the court to adopt the strict 
interpretation of the pretrial notice requirement.
338
  The First Circuit 
therefore was tasked with determining whether to adopt the strict 
approach, which had been adopted by the Second Circuit,
339
 or the 
flexible approach, which had been adopted by various other circuits 
including the Third, Eleventh, and Eighth Circuits.
340
  First Circuit 
precedent had endorsed the flexible approach in civil cases, but 
cautioned that such an approach might not be appropriate in the criminal 
context.
341
  The court affirmatively stated that the appeal required that it 
“examine the issue in the context of a criminal case.”
342
 
                                                          
 333.  Id. at 905. 
 334.  United States v. Panzardi-Lesperi, 918 F.2d 313, 317–18 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 335.  Id. at 315.  
 336.  Id. 
 337.  Id.  
 338.  Id. at 317. 
 339.  Id.; see also United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 358 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 340.  Panzardi-Lesperi, 918 F.2d at 317; see also United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3d 
Cir. 1978); Lloyd v. Prof’l Realty Servs., Inc., 734 F.2d 1428, 1434 n.15 (11th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 341.  Panzardi-Lesperi, 918 F.2d at 317; see also Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 93 (1st Cir. 
1980).   
 342.  Panzardi-Lesperi, 918 F.2d at 317. 
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The First Circuit first observed that the legislative history of the 
residual exception provided little guidance on the inquiry (despite the 
fact that the language of the rule seems to provide a clear statement of 
the meaning of the notice requirement).
343
  The court then turned to the 
facts of the case to examine the adequacy of the mid-trial notice that was 
actually provided by the government.  Of note to the court were the facts 
that the government had turned the grand jury testimony over to the 
defendant on the first day of trial, that the testimony wasn’t introduced 
until the seventh day of trial, and that “[t]he statement [was] short and 
straightforward and was consistent with, and corroborated by, other 
evidence on the record.”
344
  While none of these considerations appear 
remotely relevant to the Rule’s clear wording that pretrial notice be 
provided, they do demonstrate fidelity to the principle notion of avoiding 
surprise and prejudice.  The court affirmed the district court’s utilization 
of the residual exception—demonstrating, again, the considerable 
discretion granted to district judges to admit residual hearsay.
345
  Indeed, 
the court noted that in light of the seven days worth of advance notice 
before admission, Panzardi-Lespier could “hardly claim surprise as to its 
content,” and could not claim he had insufficient time to review the 
statement and prepare a defense accordingly.
346
  The court thus held that 
the flexible approach to pretrial notice applies to both the civil and 
criminal proceedings, and that allowing the jury to hear the grand jury 
testimony “is in harmony with both the interest of justice and the general 
purposes of the Rules of Evidence.”
347
  Panzardi-Lespier represents the 
prevailing approach to pretrial notice by which courts seem to excuse the 
plain language of the Rule in favor of an approach that finds notice is 
sufficient if it affords a party adequate time to prepare to defend the 
statement when it is introduced at trial. 
In United States v. Bracey, the Fourth Circuit discussed the pretrial 
notice requirement in a case that also involved an appeal from a drug 
conspiracy conviction.
348 
 Like Panzardi-Lespier, Bracey involved the 
introduction of grand jury testimony of a cooperating witness who 
                                                          
 343.  Id.  
 344.  Id. (footnote omitted). 
 345.  Id. at 318. 
 346.  Id. at 317. 
 347.  Id. at 318 (citing FED. R. EVID. 102).  This holding statement appears to conflate the 
interests of justice requirement with the notice requirement in a manner that is plainly inconsistent 
with the clear statutory text of the residual exception.  
 348.  United States v. Bracey, Nos. 95-5668, 96-4008, 95-5670, 1996 WL 741129 (4th Cir. Dec. 
30, 1996) (per curiam). 
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became unavailable in the weeks leading up to trial.
349
  Despite the 
government’s desperate attempt to locate the witness before trial, she 
could not be found, and “[o]n the first Friday of the trial, . . . the 
government met ex parte with the trial judge and explained that [the 
witness] was missing.”
350
  Accordingly, the court had to determine 
whether it was an error for the district court to have admitted the 
evidence at trial despite the absence of pretrial notice. 
The court began by stating that, in an “ordinary” case, the notice 
requirement should be strictly interpreted, but observed that “when 
‘reasonable steps’ have been taken to locate an unavailable witness, and 
‘pretrial notice [is] wholly impracticable,’ a court should grant ‘notice 
flexibility’ under Rule 804(b)(5).”
351
  The court further noted that, while 
a continuance to the non-offering party is the “preferred remedy,” there 
have been cases in which the notice requirement has been waived 
because “the defense was substantially aware of the gist of the 
testimony.”
352
  The notion that the Rules vest the court with the authority 
to waive an express notice requirement has, of course, no basis in the text 
of Rule 807.  It is possible, however, that a court could look to Rule 102, 
which states that the Federal Rules of Evidence should be interpreted to 
“promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the 
truth and securing a just determination.”
353
 
After observing that the notice requirement could in fact be waived, 
the court went on to examine factors that could support the admission of 
residual hearsay “despite the lack of notice.”
354
  The Fourth Circuit found 
the following factors noteworthy: (1) that the government brought the 
unavailability of the witness to the court’s attention;
355
 (2) that the 
government notified the defense of the witness’s unavailability and its 
need to admit the grand jury testimony; (3) that the district court granted 
a two-day continuance upon the defense’s request; (4) that the jury did 
                                                          
 349.  Id. at *1.  
 350.  Id. at *3.  
 351.  Id. at *4 (quoting United States v. Baker, 985 F.2d 1248, 1253 n.3 (4th Cir. 1993)). 
 352.  Id. (citing Panzardi-Lespier, 918 F.2d at 317–15; United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, 
291 (5th Cir. 1976)). 
 353.  FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 354.  Bracey, 1996 WL 741129, at *4.  
 355.  Id.  It is unclear how it is remotely relevant that a party give notice to an opposing party of 
its intent to admit residual hearsay.  Although not entirely clear from the opinion, the court seemed 
to believe it was necessary to give only ex parte warning, concluding that “[t]he district court 
correctly decided that the possible danger to Chambers’ safety justified a delay in informing the 
appellants of her disappearance from government custody.”  Id. 
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not hear the testimony until six days after notice was provided; (5) that 
the defense had knowledge that the witness’s testimony “would be a 
major aspect of the government’s case, and knew the substance of [the] 
testimony”; and (6) that the district court “instructed the jury to give 
particular scrutiny to [the witness’s] testimony.”
356
  Based on that 
combination of factors, the court concluded that the circumstances of the 
case rendered it “a strong case for ‘notice flexibility’” and upheld the 
district court’s use of the residual exception, despite the lack of pretrial 
notice.
357
  In so holding, the court departed from the strict approach, but 
it is not entirely clear what it was about the facts of the case or the 
witness’s testimony that rendered the case extraordinary such that the 
default interpretation was rendered inapplicable. 
Although courts have continued to liberally interpret the notice 
requirement under Rule 807, some courts have excluded residual hearsay 
because a party did not provide adequate, timely notice—not just notice 
of intent to introduce an out-of-court statement, but also of intent to do so 
under the residual exception.  This approach is the minority approach, 
but it was endorsed by the Third Circuit in United States v. Pelullo.
358
  In 
Pelullo, Leonard Pelullo was convicted of wire fraud and RICO 
violations after a three-week jury trial and sentenced to twenty-four years 
in prison.
359
  Pelullo appealed, challenging numerous alleged errors at 
trial, including the allegedly erroneous introduction of hearsay evidence 
under the residual exception.
360
  On appeal, the government argued that it 
had satisfied the notice requirement by making the documents available 
                                                          
 356.  Id.   
 357.  Id. (quoting United States v. Baker, 985 F.2d 1248, 1253 n.3 (4th Cir. 1993)). 
 358.  United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1992).  
 359.  Id. at 197.  
 360.  Id.  Interestingly, in the course of his direct appeals and collateral relief efforts, the Third 
Circuit addressed Pelullo’s case six times over the course of thirteen years: 
 See, e.g., United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1992) (‘Pelullo I’) (reversing all 
but one of Pelullo’s wire fraud convictions in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania due to 
the erroneous admission of unauthenticated bank records); United States v. Pelullo, 14 
F.3d 881 (3d Cir. 1994) (reversing all of Pelullo’s convictions on the ground that it was 
error to use prior conviction upheld in Pelullo I as collateral estoppel to establish 
predicate offense in trial before second jury); United States v. Pelullo, 105 F.3d 117 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (reversing Pelullo’s wire fraud and racketeering convictions by third jury 
based primarily on government’s Brady violation in failing to disclose exculpatory 
evidence); United States v. Pelullo, 173 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming Pelullo’s wire 
fraud and racketeering convictions after his fourth trial in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania); United States v. Pelullo, 185 F.3d 863 (affirming the convictions in this 
case).  
United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 202 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005), as amended (Mar. 8, 2005).  This 
discussion involves his original appeal challenging admission under the residual exception in 1992.  
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to Pelullo prior to trial and making it clear that they would be introduced 
at trial.
361
  The Third Circuit rejected the notion that notice of intent to 
introduce hearsay is sufficient under the requirements of the Rule 807.
362
  
Instead, the court held that the rule requires “the proponent to give notice 
of its intention specifically to rely on the rule as grounds for 
admissibility.”
363
  Accordingly, the court found that the testimony could 
not be introduced under the residual exception for failure to provide 
adequate notice of intent to rely on Rule 807.
364
  Clearly, this approach is 
contrary to the approach taken by the First and Fourth Circuits, and the 
propriety of this approach appears to have divided the circuit courts.
365
 
Bracey and Panzardi-Lespier demonstrate a common approach 
where federal courts place greater importance on policy considerations 
than the text of the rule by adopting a flexible approach to pretrial 
notice—a trend that has been perpetuated since the inception of the 
residual exception.  It appears that these courts are resistant to allow the 
procedural requirements of the rule to outweigh the purpose of the rule, 
thus admitting residual hearsay into evidence so long as an adverse party 
has adequate time to meet it.  The harm to the truth-seeking function of a 
jury caused by excluding probative evidence further motivates these 
courts to admit evidence under the residual exception, despite the lack of 
pretrial notice.  Pelullo, on the other hand, represents the strict 
interpretation of the pretrial notice requirement, one where residual 
hearsay will be excluded without litigation-specific notice, regardless of 
whether the defendant had an adequate opportunity to defend against it. 
These cases illustrate the inconsistency of the text of the rule and the 
purpose of the rule.  As observed in Residual Exceptions: the flexible 
approach is consistent with sound policy but is inconsistent with the text 
of the rule; the strict approach is consistent with the text of the rule but is 
not often sound as a matter of policy.
366
  Something’s gotta give.  This 
approach begs the question as to why Rule 807 has not yet been amended 
                                                          
 361.  Pelullo, 964 F.2d at 202.  
 362.  Id.  
 363.  Id. (citing United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 1989)).  
 364.  Id. at 202–03. 
 365.  The Third Circuit also cited two different circuit court opinions that differ on the extent to 
which the proponent of residual hearsay must notify an adversary of its intent to rely on the residual 
exception.  Compare United States v. Tafollo-Cardenas, 897 F.2d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring 
notice of intent to rely on the residual exception), with United States v. Benavente Gomez, 921 F.2d 
378, 384 (1st Cir. 1990) (deciding to only require notice of intent to use hearsay statements).  In 
Pelullo, the Third Circuit opted to follow the approach of the Ninth Circuit in Tafollo-Cardenas. 
 366.  Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 905.  
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so that these policy judgments by the courts are consistent with the plain 
mandate of the residual exception’s text.  Although history suggests that 
the residual exception will persist as one of the many rules that is 
intentionally misconstrued to further judicial views on wise public 
policy, this Article proposes the following minor amendment to Rule 
807(b) that will square the policy and the text of the rule.  The text of 
Rule 807(b) should now read: 
 
(b) (1) The statement is admissible only if, before the trial or 
hearing, the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice 
of the intent to offer the statement and its particulars, including 
the declarant’s name and address, so that the party has a fair 
opportunity to meet it. 
 
(2) In the event pretrial notice cannot be provided in accordance 
with paragraph (1), later notice consistent with the terms of 
paragraph (1) may be sufficient in a district judge’s discretion so 
long as an adverse party has a fair opportunity to meet it, the 
proponent provides notice that the out-of-court statement will be 
admitted under Rule 807(a), and the notice is provided as soon 
as the proponent reasonably believes the out-of-court statement 
will be admitted at trial.
367
 
 IV. SURVEY OF STATE APPROACHES TO THE ADMISSION OF RESIDUAL 
HEARSAY 
A majority of states have followed the federal courts’ lead and 
enacted a residual exception to the hearsay rule.
368
  Specifically, thirty 
states have adopted a residual exception applicable in state-court 
proceedings.
369
  Twenty states and the District of Columbia have not 
                                                          
 367.  The comments should provide that, in the event residual hearsay is admitted without 
pretrial notice, upon request, judges should provide the non-offering party the opportunity for a 
continuance of reasonable time such that the party has a fair opportunity to meet it. 
 368.  See infra Appendix. 
 369.  These states include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  See infra 
Appendix.  There is also a residual exception to the hearsay rule applicable in Puerto Rico, Guam, 
American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands.  See infra Appendix. 
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adopted a residual exception to the hearsay rule,
370
 with some of these 
states having offered an explicit, critical rejection of the notion of a 
catch-all exception.
371
  This Part provides a brief overview of various 
state-law approaches to admitting residual hearsay.  An examination of 
the variations among state exceptions,
372
 as well as the differences 
between the federal and state residual exceptions, sheds light on the 
differences between the liberal federal approach to residual hearsay and a 
more cautious approach utilized in state courts.
373
 
The number of states adopting a residual exception has appeared to 
level off in recent years.
374
  Most state residual exceptions, with certain 
outliers, mirror either Rule 807 or the dual residual exceptions—Rules 
803(24) and 804(5)—that were in place before the 1997 amendment to 
the rules.  Among those thirty states that have embraced the residual 
                                                          
 370.  Alabama, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, 
Virginia, and Washington.  See infra Appendix. 
 371.  For instance, the comments to the New Jersey Rules of Evidence explain:  
The adoption of the federal rule was attended by substantial controversy and its 
application since its adoption has been disparate among the federal courts. See A.B.A. 
Section of Litigation, Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules of Evidence 279-281 
(1983).  The adoption of Fed. R. Evid. 803(24), construable as a general relaxation rule, 
would represent a radical departure from New Jersey practice.  The advantages and 
disadvantages of this departure are debatable. 
N.J. R. EVID. 803 official comments.  
Moreover, the comments to the Alabama Rules provide:  
It should be noted that these rules do not include what is known as a “residual” or 
“catchall” exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(24).  The committee 
expresses no position as to whether the Alabama Supreme Court may expand the number 
of hearsay exceptions by decision. See Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance 
Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).  However, the committee believes that any expansion 
in the number of hearsay exceptions generally should be accomplished, rather than on a 
case-by-case basis, by the Alabama Supreme Court’s acting under its authority to 
prescribe rules of practice and procedure. 
ALA. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s notes.  
 372.  For prior surveys of the residual exception, see Beaver, supra note 1, at 789 & n.19; 
Leonard Birdsong, The Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule—Has It Been Abused—A Survey 
Since the 1997 Amendment, 26 NOVA L. REV. 59, 65 (2001); G. Michael Fenner, The Residual 
Exception to the Hearsay Rule: The Complete Treatment, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 265 passim 
(2000). 
 373.  See Birdsong, supra note 372, at 97 (“It is clear the state court judges in the civil cases 
reported on here have not abused their power with respect to the residual exception.”).  In fact, in the 
civil context, state court judges “appear to be very careful with respect to the admission of hearsay 
pursuant to the residual exception.” Id. at 95. 
 374.  In 1993, Professor James Beaver observed that twenty-four states had refused to adopt the 
residual exception. Beaver, supra note 1, at 789.  In 2001, Professor Leonard Birdsong found that 
twenty-eight states and Puerto Rico had adopted a residual exception.  Birdsong, supra note 372, at 
64 n.38.  
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exception, thirteen have retained the dual residual exceptions based on 
the pre-1997 amendments—with one exception governing the out-of-
court statements of unavailable declarants and the other under which 
availability of the declarant is immaterial.  Eleven states followed 
Congress’s lead in adopting a single, unified residual exception based on 
Rule 807 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Numerous states, which have been included in the thirty counted 
above, have enacted modified or limited residual exceptions.  
Connecticut’s rule, for example, expressly provides that an out-of-court 
statement otherwise not admissible under an enumerated exception is 
admissible if “there is a reasonable necessity for the admission of the 
statement” and “the statement is supported by equivalent guarantees of 
trustworthiness and reliability that are essential to other evidence 
admitted under traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule.”
375
  
Connecticut’s rule also omits the pretrial notice requirement.
376
  
Louisiana’s residual exception only applies in civil cases in which the 
declarant is unavailable.
377
  The rule also permits a court to “authorize a 
delayed notice to be given” or “a recess, continuance, or other 
appropriate relief sufficient to enable [the nonoffering party] to prepare 
to meet the evidence” in the event that pretrial notice is “not practicable 
or failure to give notice is found by the court to have been excusable.”
378
 
Montana and Wisconsin preserve the distinction between Rule 803 
and Rule 804; however, those states have repudiated most of the 
requirements for admitting residual hearsay, including the pretrial notice 
requirement.
379
  The Montana and Wisconsin residual exceptions provide 
simply for the admission of “[a] statement not specifically covered by 
any of the foregoing exceptions but having comparable circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness.”
380
  This version of the residual exception 
“is identical to the Exception (24) contained in the version of the Federal 
Rules submitted to Congress.”
381
  The comments to the Montana rules 
explain that “the notice requirement is unnecessary because of discovery 
procedures and the discretion of the court in allowing advance rulings on 
                                                          
 375.  CONN. CODE OF EVID. § 8-9. 
 376.  See id. 
 377.  LA. CODE OF EVID. art. 804(b)(6). 
 378.  Id. 
 379.  See infra Appendix.  
 380.  MONT. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5); WISC. STAT. ANN. §§ 908.03(24), 908.045(6) (West 
2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 381.  MONT. R. EVID. 803(24) commission comments.   
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the admissibility of evidence.”
382
 
Likewise, Nevada preserves the unavailable declarant distinction, yet 
its two residual exceptions differ slightly.  Both exceptions provide that 
the enumerated exceptions under the Nevada Rules “are illustrative and 
not restrictive of the [residual] exception.”
383
  The Nevada exception, 
under which availability is immaterial, provides that “[a] statement is not 
excluded by the hearsay rule if its nature and the special circumstances 
under which it was made offer assurances of accuracy not likely to be 
enhanced by calling the declarant as a witness, even though the declarant 
is available.”
384
  The Nevada exception applicable to unavailable 
declarants provides that such a statement is not excluded by the hearsay 
rule if “[i]ts nature and the special circumstances under which it was 
made offer strong assurances of accuracy.”
385
 
New Hampshire omits the notice requirement if the out-of-court 
statement is being offered under Rule 803, but requires notice of intent to 
offer the hearsay statement of an unavailable declarant under Rule 
804.
386
  In addition to the traditional requirements, Oklahoma’s residual 
exception allows for notice to be provided during trial “if the court 
excuses pretrial notice for good cause.”
387
  Oklahoma’s rule additionally 
requires that, in order to be admitted under the residual exception, a court 
must “state on the record the circumstances that support its determination 
of the admissibility of the statement offered.”
388
  Oklahoma’s rule is also 
expressly limited to only “exceptional circumstances” not covered by the 
                                                          
 382.  Id.  The Commission’s comments further explained: 
These amendments [offered by Congress to the originally proposed residual exception] 
can be criticized as follows: the requirement that the statement be offered as evidence of 
a “material” fact is redundant in requiring relevance as defined in Rule 401 and uses 
outmoded language so indicated in the Commission Comments to that rule.  The 
requirement that the evidence be more probative on the point for which it is offered 
restricts the use of these types of exceptions by imposing a requirement similar to that of 
unavailability under Rule 804; this restriction would have the effect of severely limiting 
the instances in which the exception would be used and be impractical in the sense that a 
party would generally offer the strongest evidence available regardless of the existence of 
this requirement.  The requirement that the general purposes of these rules and interests 
of justice will be served is unnecessarily repetitive in view of Rule 102.  Finally, the 
notice requirement is unnecessary because of discovery procedures and the discretion of 
the court in allowing advance rulings on the admissibility of evidence. 
Id. 
 383.  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.075(2), 51.215(2) (West 2004). 
 384.  Id. § 51.075(1). 
 385.  Id. § 51.315(1)(a).  
 386.  N.H. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(6).  
 387.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2804.1(C) (West 2009). 
 388.  Id. § 2804.1(B).  
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other enumerated exceptions under state law.
389
 
While not included on the list of states that have adopted a residual 
exception, the Tennessee Rules acknowledge that, despite the absence of 
a codified residual exception, “[o]ccasionally . . . constitutional 
considerations require that a tribunal permit the accused in a criminal 
case to introduce trustworthy hearsay not falling within a traditional 
exception.”
390
  Additionally, both Florida and Ohio have limited 
exceptions that have been referred to as “quasi residual” exceptions.  For 
instance, the Florida exception has been described as follows: 
Section 90.803(23) of the Florida Evidence Code, allows the use of out-
of-court statements of a child, eleven years old or less, describing child 
abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse against the child, after the court holds a 
hearing to determine reliability of such statements.  The statute is 
applicable whether the child is available or unavailable to testify.  If the 
child is unavailable to testify and the statements are deemed to be 
reliable by the court, there must be other corroborating evidence of the 
offense before such statement may be used.  There is also a ten day 
notice requirement that must be given to a defendant in a criminal case.  
Finally, the court, under this statute must make specific findings of fact 
on the record as to the basis for its ruling to admit or exclude the 
statements.  Section 90.803(24) of the Florida Evidence Code is 
identical, except that it applies to elderly or disabled adults.
391
 
Ohio’s exception is similarly limited to out-of-court statements made 
by a child under the age of twelve that is “describing any sexual act 
performed by, with, or on the child or describing any act of physical 
violence directed against the child.”
392
  In order to be admissible under 
this exception, a court must find “the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the statement provides particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness that make the statement at least as reliable 
as statements admitted” pursuant to the enumerated exceptions.
393
  The 
court must further find that the circumstances surrounding the statement 
“must establish that the child was particularly likely to be telling the truth 
when the statement was made and that the test of cross-examination 
would add little to the reliability of the statement.”
394
  The child’s 
testimony must not be reasonably obtainable by the proponent, as 
                                                          
 389.  Id. § 2804.1(A). 
 390.  TENN. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) advisory commission’s comment. 
 391.  Birdsong, supra note 372, at 65–66. 
 392.  OHIO R. EVID. 807(A). 
 393.  Id. 807(A)(1).  
 394.  Id. 
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defined by Rule 807(B), and there must be “independent proof of the 
sexual act or act of physical violence.”
395
  Lastly, the proponent must 




Under state rules of evidence, the touchstone of admissibility under 
the residual exception remains the trustworthiness of the statement in 
light of the circumstances surrounding its making.  As previously 
discussed, most states, either through common law, statute, or rule, have 
developed various factors that courts must consider when determining 
trustworthiness.
397
  These factors often vary, but state courts generally 
engage in a fact-specific inquiry looking at the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the out-of-court statement 
when assessing trustworthiness.
398
  Most states that have adopted a 
                                                          
 395.  Id. 807(A)(2)–(3); 807(B). 
 396.  Id. 807(A)(4).  
 397.  See Birdsong, supra note 372, at 95 (“These judges use the same analytical framework of 
seeking to determine whether there are appropriate indicia of reliability to give the statements 
trustworthiness.”). 
 398.  See, e.g., People v. Shifrin, 342 P.3d 506, 518–19 (Colo. App. 2014) (listing seven factors), 
cert. denied, No. 14SC268, 2015 WL 216599 (Colo. Jan. 12, 2015); State v. Weaver, 554 N.W.2d 
240, 248 (Iowa 1996) (discussing factors to consider), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Hallum, 585 N.W.2d 249 (Iowa 1998); State v. Nichols, 365 S.E.2d 561, 566–67 (N.C. 1988) 
(listing factors); State v. Jagielski, 467 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (listing factors).  For 
instance, Colorado considers the following factors when determining trustworthiness under the state 
residual exception:  
1) the nature and character of the statement; 2) the relationship of the parties; 3) the 
motivation of the declarant; 4) the circumstances under which the statement was made; 5) 
the knowledge and qualifications of the declarant; 6) the existence or lack of 
corroboration; and 7) the availability of the declarant at trial for cross-examination.  
Shifrin, 342 P.3d at 518–19 (quoting Abdelsamed v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 421, 426–27 (Colo. 
App. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, Hock v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 876 P.2d 1242 (Colo. 1994)).  
North Carolina uses a similar list of factors to determine whether hearsay is sufficiently trustworthy 
to be admitted under the state residual exception:  
(1) the declarant’s personal knowledge of the underlying event; (2) the declarant’s 
motivation to speak the truth; (3) whether the declarant recanted; and (4) the reason, 
within the meaning of Rule 804(a), for declarant’s unavailability. . . .  [T]his list is not 
inclusive . . . .  Among the many factors which courts have considered are [5] the 
existence of corroborating evidence, and [6] the degree to which the proffered testimony 
has elements of enumerated exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
 Nichols, 365 S.E.2d at 566–67 (citations omitted). 
Under Iowa law, to support admission of a statement under the residual hearsay exception for having 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, trial courts consider, among other factors, 
“corroboration, reaffirming or recanting the statement by the declarant, credibility of the witness 
reporting the statement, and availability of the declarant for cross-examination.”  Weaver, 554 
N.W.2d at 248. 
When considering the admissibility of a child’s hearsay statements under the residual exception, 
Wisconsin courts consider:  
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residual exception have some form of probativeness requirement, and 
almost all have a notice requirement similar to Rule 807(b).
399
 
Twenty states have opted against adopting a catchall exception under 
their rules of evidence.
400
  Given the number of states refusing to enact a 
residual exception to the hearsay rule, the views expressed by the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Pope
401
 
appear to be shared by a great number of state courts and legislatures.  In 
Pope, the court rejected the state’s urging for the court to adopt a residual 
exception modeled after the federal rule, stating “we see no reason to 
adopt the rather broad Federal formulation as a general rule.”
402
  The 
court went on to conclude, “[w]e do not believe the administration of 
justice in this Commonwealth would be advanced by adoption of a rule 




In sum, this survey demonstrates that there is considerable debate 
among the states regarding the propriety of the residual exception.  
Thirty states, and various U.S. territories, have adopted the residual 
exception in some form, while twenty states and the District of Columbia 
have rejected the exception.  Two states have rejected the exception but 
provide for a similar exception for statements of child victims.  One of 
those states, Florida, also includes an exception for statements made by 
elderly or disabled victims.  Seven states have a modified residual 
exception, two of which require only circumstantial guarantees of 
                                                          
(1) the attributes of the child making the statements, including age, comprehension, 
verbal ability and motivations; (2) the person to whom statements were made, the 
relationship to the child and potential motivations to fabricate or distort; (3) the 
circumstances under which the statements were made, including the relation to the time 
of the assault, the availability of a person in whom the child might confide and other 
contextual factors relating to the statements’ trustworthiness; (4) the content of 
statements, noting any sign of deceit, falsity, and whether they reveal a knowledge of 
matters not ordinarily attributable to a child of similar age; and (5) other corroborating 
evidence, such as physical evidence of an assault, statements made to others and 
opportunity or motive of the defendant. 
Jagielski, 467 N.W.2d at 198. 
 399.  See Birdsong, supra note 372, at 65 (observing that both “Nevada and Wisconsin omit the 
notice requirement of the federal rule”).  
 400.  See infra Appendix.  Those states are: Alabama, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.  Florida and Ohio have 
limited residual exceptions that apply in very limited situations.  See supra notes 391–96 and 
accompanying text. 
 401.  Commonwealth v. Pope, 491 N.E.2d 240, 244–45 (Mass. 1986). 
 402.  Id. at 244 (citing Residual Exceptions, supra note 1, at 867).  
 403.  Id. at 244 n.9. 
778 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
trustworthiness for admissibility. 
Much can be learned about the purpose and function of the residual 
exception to the hearsay rule by examining these various state 
approaches.  What does appear clear based on a survey of the subtle 
distinctions among the state-law approaches to residual hearsay is that 
litigants would do well to closely monitor the jurisdiction-specific, 
residual-exception case law that will be governing their adversarial 
proceedings. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article serves to update Professor Sonenshein’s in-depth 
analysis of the residual exception to the hearsay rule found in his 1982 
article Residual Exceptions.  Since Residual Exceptions was first 
published, the rule governing the admission of residual hearsay has 
undergone some change; it has been twice amended and has been 
subsequently adopted in some form in thirty states. 
Yet not all has changed.  The various requirements of the rule 
continue to be interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the intent that 
the exception be used only in extraordinary circumstances, and the notice 
provision is still desperately in need of an amendment.  Ultimately what 
remains unchanged since the early interpretations of the rule is the 
considerable discretion trial courts are granted in determining the 
admissibility of hearsay under the residual exception—discretion that, 
when combined with the harmless error doctrine, is rarely disturbed by 
appellate courts.  In that light, the above survey of the residual exception 
calls to mind the out-of-court statements of the storied English legal 
scholar Lord Edward Coke: “It is the function of a judge not to make but 
to declare the law, according to the golden mete-wand of the law and not 









Appendix: State Residual Exceptions 
 
                                                          
 404.  1 EDWARD COKE ET AL., INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 51 (16th ed. 1809). 







Alabama No Committee Note: 
It should be noted that these rules do not include 
what is known as a “residual” or “catchall” 
exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 
803(24).  The committee expresses no position as 
to whether the Alabama Supreme Court may 
expand the number of hearsay exceptions by 
decision.  See Dallas County v. Commercial 
Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 
1961).  However, the committee believes that any 
expansion in the number of hearsay exceptions 
generally should be accomplished, rather than on a 
case-by-case basis, by the Alabama Supreme 
Court’s acting under its authority to prescribe 
rules of practice and procedure. 
 
ALA. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s notes. 
Alaska Yes Alaska Rules 803(23) & 804(b)(5) 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
Arizona Yes Arizona Rule 807 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
Arkansas Yes Arkansas Rules 803(24) & 804(b)(5) 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
California No  
Colorado Yes Colorado Rule 807 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
 
      Colorado considers the following factors when 
determining trustworthiness under the state 
residual exception: 
1) the nature and character of the statement; 2) 
the relationship of the parties; 3) the 
                                                          
 405.  For brevity’s sake, the language of the rule in jurisdictions that have residual exceptions 
identical or nearly identical to Rule 807, or former Rules 803(24) and 804(5), has not been included 
in the Appendix.  Also, language taken directly from the state statute, or its comments, may not be 
encased in quotation marks, whereas language from state cases interpreting the statute is in quotation 
marks or formatted as a block quote. This is to save space in the chart as well as for ease of reading. 
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motivation of the declarant; 4) the 
circumstances under which the statement was 
made; 5) the knowledge and qualifications of 
the declarant; 6) the existence or lack of 
corroboration; and 7) the availability of the 
declarant at trial for cross-examination. 
People v. Shifrin, 342 P.3d 506, 518–19 (Colo. 
App. 2014) (quoting Abdelsamed v. N.Y. Life Ins. 
Co., 857 P.2d 421, 426–27 (Colo. App. 1992), 
rev’d on other grounds, Hock v. N.Y. Life Ins. 
Co., 876 P.2d 1242 (Colo. 1994)), cert. denied, 
No. 14SC268, 2015 WL 216599 (Colo. Jan. 12, 
2015). 
Connecticut Yes, but 
modified 
A statement that is not admissible under any of the 
foregoing exceptions is admissible if the court 
determines that (1) there is a reasonable necessity 
for the admission of the statement, and (2) the 
statement is supported by equivalent guarantees of 
trustworthiness and reliability that are essential to 
other evidence admitted under traditional 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
 
CONN. CODE OF EVID. § 8-9. 
Delaware Yes Delaware Rule 807 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
Florida No For a discussion of Florida’s quasi-residual 
exception, see supra text accompanying note 391. 
Georgia Yes Georgia Code Annotated section 24-8-807 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 




Other exceptions.  A statement not specifically 
covered by any of the exceptions in this paragraph 
(b) but having equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court 
determines that (A) the statement is more 
probative on the point for which it is offered than 
any other evidence which the proponent can 
procure through reasonable efforts, and (B) the 
general purposes of these rules and the interests of 
justice will best be served by admission of the 
statement into evidence.  However, a statement 
may not be admitted under this exception unless 
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the proponent of it makes known to the adverse 
party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing 
to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent’s 
intention to offer the statement and the particulars 
of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
 
HAW. R. EVID. 803(b)(24).  The residual 
exception for unavilable declarants contains 
materially similar language. HAW. R. EVID. 
804(b)(8). 
Idaho Yes Idaho Rules 803(24) & 804(b)(6) 
[Modeled after Federal Rule]  
Illinois No  
Indiana No  
Iowa Yes Iowa Rules of Evidence Rule 5.807 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
 
      In determining whether a hearsay statement is 
trustworthy, to support admission of the statement 
under the residual hearsay exception for having 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, the 
trial court considers: corroboration, reaffirming or 
recanting the statement by the declarant, 
credibility of the witness reporting the statement, 
and the availability of the declarant for cross-
examination. State v. Weaver, 554 N.W.2d 240, 
248 (Iowa 1996), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Hallun, 585 N.W.2d 249 (Iowa 1998).  
Kansas No  
Kentucky No  
Louisiana Yes, but 
limited 
Only applies in civil cases where the declarant is 
unavailable, and the statute reads as follows: 
Other exceptions.  In a civil case, a statement not 
specifically covered by any of the foregoing 
exceptions if the court determines that considering 
all pertinent circumstances in the particular case 
the statement is trustworthy, and the proponent of 
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the evidence has adduced or made a reasonable 
effort to adduce all other admissible evidence to 
establish the fact to which the proffered statement 
relates and the proponent of the statement makes 
known in writing to the adverse party and to the 
court his intention to offer the statement and the 
particulars of it, including the name and address of 
the declarant, sufficiently in advance of the trial or 
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet it.  If, under the 
circumstances of a particular case, giving of this 
notice was not practicable or failure to give notice 
is found by the court to have been excusable, the 
court may authorize a delayed notice to be given, 
and in that event the opposing party is entitled to a 
recess, continuance, or other appropriate relief 
sufficient to enable him to prepare to meet the 
evidence. 
 
LA. CODE EVID. art. 804(B)(6).  
Maine No  
Maryland Yes 
 
Maryland Rules of Evidence Rule 5-803(b)(24) 
[Modeled after Federal Rule]  
 
Committee note: The residual exception provided 
by Rule 5-803(b)(24) does not contemplate an 
unfettered exercise of judicial discretion, but it 
does provide for treating new and presently 
unanticipated situations which demonstrate a 
trustworthiness within the spirit of the specifically 
stated exceptions.  Within this framework, room is 
left for growth and development of the law of 
evidence in the hearsay area, consistently with the 
broad purposes expressed in Rule 5-102. 
      It is intended that the residual hearsay 
exception will be used very rarely, and only in 
exceptional circumstances.  The Committee does 
not intend to establish a broad license for trial 
judges to admit hearsay statements that do not fall 
within one of the other exceptions contained in 
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Rules 5-803 and 5-804 (b). 
 
MD. R. EVID. 5-803(b)(24) committee’s note. 
Massachusetts No Committee Note: 
There is no “innominate” or catchall exception to 
the hearsay rule in Massachusetts whereby 
hearsay may be admitted on an ad hoc basis 
provided that there are circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness.  See Commonwealth v. Pope, 
397 Mass. 275, 281–282, 491 N.E.2d 240, 244 
(1986); Commonwealth v. Meech, 380 Mass. 490, 
497, 403 N.E.2d 1174, 1179 (1980); 
Commonwealth v. White, 370 Mass. 703, 713, 352 
N.E.2d 904, 911 (1976). 
 
MASS. R. EVID. § 802 notes. 
Michigan Yes Michigan Rules of Evidence 803(24) & 
804(b)(7) 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
Minnesota Yes Minnesota Rules of Evidence 807 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
Mississippi Yes Mississippi Rules of Evidence 803(24) & 
804(b)(5) 
[Modeled after Federal Rule]  
 
Committee Note: 
The rule reflects the realization that the law is not 
stagnant.  As the FRE Advisory Committee’s Note 
indicates, it would be presumptuous to assume 
that the contemporary legal community has 
enumerated every single hearsay exception which 
possibl could exist.  The exceptions are not a 
closed system, and Rule 803(24) and its 
counterpart Rule 804(b)(5) allow for the future 
development of the law when the guarantees of 
reliability and trustworthiness can be found.  
While these two rules allow for judicial discretion, 
they do not permit an unfettered discretion which 
could ultimately devour the hearsay rule.  Before 
admitting statements under this rule, the judge 
must make a finding that the statements being 
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offered are sufficiently trustworthy and reliable. 
See Cummins v. State, 515 So.2d 869 (Miss. 
1987).  One of the clearest examples of the 
circumstances meeting the criteria of Rule 803(24) 
is found in Dallas County v. Commercial Union 
Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 
MISS. R. EVID. 803(24) advisory committee’s 
comment. 
Missouri No  









“Other exceptions. A statement not specifically 
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but 
having comparable circumstantial guarantees of 




      This exception is identical to the Exception 
(24) contained in the version of the Federal Rules 
submitted to Congress.  Congress amended that 
exception to require, in addition to circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness, that the statement is 
offered as evidence of material fact, that it is more 
probative on the point for which it is offered than 
any other evidence, that the general purposes of 
the rules and interests of justice will be served, 
and that notice be served on the adversary. 
      The Commission believed this exception 
should allow “room for growth and development 
of the law of evidence in the area of hearsay” and 
that the amendments by Congress are too 
restrictive and contrary to the purpose of the 
provision.  These amendments can be criticized as 
follows: the requirement that the statement be 
offered as evidence of a “material” fact is 
redundant in requiring relevance as defined in 
Rule 401 and uses outmoded language so 
indicated in the Commission Comments to that 
rule.  The requirement that the evidence be more 
probative on the point for which it is offered 
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restricts the use of these types of exceptions by 
imposing a requirement similar to that of 
unavailability under Rule 804; this restriction 
would have the effect of severely limiting the 
instances in which the exception would be used 
and be impractical in the sense that a party would 
generally offer the strongest evidence available 
regardless of the existence of this requirement.  
The requirement that the general purposes of these 
rules and interests of justice will be served is 
unnecessarily repetitive in view of Rule 102.  
Finally, the notice requirement is unnecessary 
because of discovery procedures and the 
discretion of the court in allowing advance rulings 
on the admissibility of evidence. 
      The guarantee of trustworthiness set out in the 
Commission Comments to each of the other 
exceptions is the criteria to be used in determining 
whether to apply this open-ended exception and 
find a “comparable circumstantial guarantee of 
trustworthiness.” 
      There is no equivalent Montana law to this 
exception.  The adoption of this exception changes 
existing Montana law to the extent that it allows a 
court to admit hearsay because an equivalent 
guarantee of trustworthiness exists even though 
there is no specific exception allowing it. 
 
MONT. R. EVID. 803 commission comments 
(citations omitted).  
Nebraska Yes Nebraska Rules 27-803(23) & 27-804(2)(e) 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
Nevada Yes, but 
modified 
Availability Immaterial Exception: 
1. A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule 
if its nature and the special circumstances under 
which it was made offer assurances of accuracy 
not likely to be enhanced by calling the declarant 
as a witness, even though the declarant is 
available. 
2. The provisions of NRS 51.085 to 51.305, 
inclusive, are illustrative and not restrictive of the 
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exception provided by this section.  
 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51.075 (West, Westlaw 
through the end of the 78th Reg. Sess.). 
 
Unavailability Exception: 
1. A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule 
if: 
(a) Its nature and the special circumstances under 
which it was made offer strong assurances of 
accuracy; and 
(b) The declarant is unavailable as a witness. 
2. The provisions of NRS 51.325 to 51.355, 
inclusive, are illustrative and not restrictive of the 
exception provided by this section. 
 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51.315 (West, Westlaw 
through the end of the 78th Reg. Sess.). 
New 
Hampshire 








New Hampshire Rules of Evidence 803(24) & 
804(b)(6) 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
 
Committee Note: 
      As indicated in the early case of Lane v. Hill, 
68 N.H. 275, 44 A. 393 (1895), the New 
Hampshire courts have for some time followed a 
liberal approach with respect to the admissibility 
of hearsay statements.  Their philosophy was best 
expressed by Chief Justice Kenison in Perry v. 
Parker, 101 N.H. 295, 141 A.2d 883 (1958).  He 
stated that “The fundamental inquiry is not the 
name or number of the exceptions to the hearsay 
rule, but whether ‘under the circumstances the 
evidence satisfies the reasons which lie behind the 
exceptions.’”  Id. at 297, 141 A.2d at 884, quoting 
McCormick, Evidence (1954) at 633.  The Chief 
Justice went on to quote and refer to two earlier 
cases, Gagnon v. Pronovost, 97 N.H. 500, 92 A.2d 
904 (1952), and Hutchins v. Berry, 75 N.H. 416, 
75 A. 650 (1910). 
      As stated by the Gagnon Court, “We believe 
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the sensible test to determine whether this 
evidence should have been admitted was 
suggested by Chief Justice Peaslee in Hutchins v. 
Berry: “Is this account so lacking in apparent 
trustworthiness that it cannot be wholly rejected, 
or should it be admitted, and the objections to it 
used to detract from its weight? The latter course 
seems the more reasonable.” Gagnon at 503, 92 
A.2d at 906, quoting Hutchins at 419, 75 A. 650. 
 
N.H. R. EVID. 803 reporter’s note. 
New Jersey No Committee Note: 
(24) Other exceptions: Not Adopted. Fed.R.Evid. 
803(24), which creates a general hearsay 
exception for statements not covered by a specific 
hearsay rule, provided they are attended by 
‘equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness’ and are the most probative 
evidence reasonably available, and provided 
further that other stated criteria are met, was not 
adopted.  The adoption of the federal rule was 
attended by substantial controversy and its 
application since its adoption has been disparate 
among the federal courts. See A.B.A. Section of 
Litigation, Emerging Problems Under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence 279–281 (1983).  The adoption 
of Fed. R. Evid. 803(24), construable as a general 
relaxation rule, would represent a radical 
departure from New Jersey practice.  The 
advantages and disadvantages of this departure are 
debatable.  For the same reason, Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(5) was not adopted.  It should be noted that 
a broad relaxation rule proposed as Rule 2(4) in 
The 1963 Report at 9 was rejected. 
 
N.J. R. EVID. 803 official comments. 
New Mexico Yes New Mexico Rule 11-807 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
New York No  
North Yes North Carolina Rules 803(24) & 804(b)(5) 
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Carolina [Modeled after Federal Rule] 
 
North Carolina considers the following factors to 
determine whether hearsay is sufficiently 
trustworthy to be admitted under the state residual 
exception: 
(1) the declarant’s personal knowledge of the 
underlying event; (2) the declarant’s 
motivation to speak the truth; (3) whether the 
declarant recanted; (4) the reason . . . for 
declarant’s unavailability . . .  [5] existence of 
corroborating evidence, and [6] the degree to 
which the proffered testimony has elements of 
enumerated exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
State v. Nichols, 365 S.E.2d 561, 566–67 (N.C. 
1988) (citations omitted). 
North Dakota Yes North Dakota Rules of Evidence 807 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
Ohio No, but 
















 Hearsay exceptions; Child statements in abuse 
cases 
(A) An out-of-court statement made by a child 
who is under twelve years of age at the time of 
trial or hearing describing any sexual act 
performed by, with, or on the child or describing 
any act of physical violence directed against the 
child is not excluded as hearsay under Evid. R. 
802 if all of the following apply: 
(1) The court finds that the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the 
statement provides particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness that make the statement at least as 
reliable as statements admitted pursuant to Evid. 
R. 803 and 804.  The circumstances must establish 
that the child was particularly likely to be telling 
the truth when the statement was made and that 
the test of cross-examination would add little to 
the reliability of the statement.  In making its 
determination of the reliability of the statement, 
the court shall consider all of the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the statement, 
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including but not limited to spontaneity, the 
internal consistency of the statement, the mental 
state of the child, the child’s motive or lack of 
motive to fabricate, the child’s use of terminology 
unexpected of a child of similar age, the means by 
which the statement was elicited, and the lapse of 
time between the act and the statement.  In making 
this determination, the court shall not consider 
whether there is independent proof of the sexual 
act or act of physical violence. 
 
(2) The child’s testimony is not reasonably 
obtainable by the proponent of the statement. 
 
(3) There is independent proof of the sexual act or 
act of physical violence. 
 
(4) At least ten days before the trial or hearing, a 
proponent of the statement has notified all other 
parties in writing of the content of the statement, 
the time and place at which the statement was 
made, the identity of the witness who is to testify 
about the statement, and the circumstances 
surrounding the statement that are claimed to 
indicate its trustworthiness.  
 
OHIO R. EVID. 807(A). 
Oklahoma Yes Hearsay Exception—Exceptional circumstances 
A. In exceptional circumstances a statement not 
covered by Section 2803, 2804, 2805, or 2806 of 
this title but possessing equivalent, though not 
identical, circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay 
rule if the court determines that: 
1.  The statement is offered as evidence of a fact 
of consequence; 
 
2.  The statement is more probative on the point 
for which it is offered than any other evidence that 
the proponent can procure through reasonable 
efforts; and 
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3.  The general purposes of this Code and the 
interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. 
 
B.  The court shall state on the record the 
circumstances that support its determination of the 
admissibility of the statement offered pursuant to 
subsection A of this section. 
 
C.  A statement is not admissible under this 
exception unless its proponent gives to all parties 
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during 
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice for good 
cause shown, of the substance of the statement 
and the identity of the declarant. 
 
OKLA. STAT. ANN.  tit. 12, § 2804.1 (West, 
Westlaw through the end of First Sess. of 55th 
Leg.). 









(a) A statement not specifically covered by any of 
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the 
court determines that: 
      (A) The statement is relevant; 
 
      (B) The statement is more probative on the 
point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence that the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; and 
 
      (C) The general purposes of the Oregon 
Evidence Code and the interests of justice will 
best be served by admission of the statement into 
evidence. 
 
(b) A statement may not be admitted under this 
subsection unless the proponent of it makes 
known to the adverse party the intention to offer 
the statement and the particulars of it, including 
the name and address of the declarant, sufficiently 
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in advance of the trial or hearing, or as soon as 
practicable after it becomes apparent that such 
statement is probative of the issues at hand, to 
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity 
to prepare to meet it. 
 
OR. R. EVID. 803(28); see also 804(3)(h) (residual 
exception for an unavailable declarant). 
Pennsylvania No  
Rhode Island Yes Rhode Island Rules of Evidence 803(24) & 
804(b)(5) 




South Dakota Yes South Dakota Rule 19-19-807 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
Tennessee No Committee Note: 
There is no residual exception even where 
declarants are unavailable.  Occasionally, 
however, constitutional considerations require a 
tribunal permit the accused in a criminal case to 
introduce trustworthy hearsay not falling within a 
traditional exception. See Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. 
Ed. 2d 297 (1973).  See also F. R. Evid. 804(b)(5). 
 
TENN. R. EVID. 804 advisory commission’s 
comment.  
Texas No  
Utah Yes Utah Rule 807 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
Vermont No  
Virginia No  
Washington No  
West Virginia Yes West Virginia Rule 807 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
Wisconsin Yes, but 
modified 
 “Other exceptions. A statement not specifically 
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but 
having comparable circumstantial guarantees of 
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trustworthiness.” WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 908.03(24), 
908.045(6) (West 2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 
Wyoming Yes Wyoming Rules 803(24) & 804(b)(6) 




Puerto Rico Yes Other exceptions.—A statement having 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if it 
is determined that: 
(i)  the statement is more probative on the point 
for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent may procure through 
reasonable efforts, and 
(ii)  the proponent notified the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance his intention to offer the 
statement, and the particulars of it, including the 
name and address of the declarant. 
 
P.R. R. EVID. 64(B)(5). 
Guam Yes Guam Rule of Evidence 807 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
American 
Samoa 
Yes American Samoa Rules 803(24) & 804(b)(5) 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
U.S. Virgin 
Islands 
Yes Virgin Islands Rule 807 




Yes Northern Mariana Islands Rule 807 
[Modeled after Federal Rule] 
 
 
 
 
